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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the legal profession has addressed a number of
controversial issues relating to its own structure. In 1999, the American
Bar Association (ABA) considered and rejected a proposal that, if adopted
by state bars, would have lifted restrictions on multidisciplinary practices
(MDPs).' These MDPs would have enabled lawyers to partner and share
fees with non-lawyers, such as accountants and consultants, and would
have profoundly affected the nature of the legal profession.2 Even more
recently, the ABA adopted amendments to the model rules regarding
multijurisdictional practice (MJP), which govern the extent to which
lawyers may practice in states where they are not licensed.3 These changes
also have the potential to shape in significant ways how attorneys practice
law in an increasingly national and global legal marketplace. Rules
regarding a lawyer's solicitation of clients, which have undergone
numerous revisions in the last twenty-five years,4 offer yet another
1. See generally COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, A.B.A., REPORT TO THE
(1999) [hereinafter COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE].
2. See id. at 1; see generally John B. Attanasio, The Brave New World of Multidisciplinary
Practice: Forward, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469,471-72 (2000); Future ofthe Profession: A Symposium
HOUSE OF DELEGATES

on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (2000); Symposium, Multidisciplinary
Practice, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2001); Multidisciplinary Practice Symposium, 32 LOY. U.

CHI. L.J. 543 (2001).
3. See REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 327 (Stephen Gillers & Roy

D. Simon eds., 2003); see also COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, A.B.A., REPORT OF
THE

COMM'N ON

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL

PRACTICE

6

(2002)

[hereinafter

COMM'N

ON

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE] (recommending the later adopted amendments).
4. The United States Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions since 1977 that have
transformed this area of law. See generally Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re

R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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example of regulations that impact how attorneys engage in the business
of practicing law. In short, the bar has considered an increasing number of
issues that have the potential to influence fundamental features of the legal
profession.
This Article contends that, although ethics scholars have developed a
rich set of theories to explain how lawyers should represent individual
clients, these ethicists have not explained in sufficient detail how their
theories should apply to regulations governing the profession's structure,
including rules relating to MDPs, MJP, and lawyer advertising. Ethicists,
in other words, have applied their theories to regulations-referred to here
as representational rules-that govern how lawyers represent their clients,
such as the duty of confidentiality or rules against the presentation of
peijured testimony.5 But theorists have not described the implications of
their theories for a second, and quite distinct, category of professional
regulation: rules relating. to the structure of the legal profession itself.
At first glance, the attention to representational rules appears
understandable given the focus of standard ethics theories. These theories
generally fall into two categories: the dominant view and its various
critics. The dominant view posits (roughly) that attorneys should pursue
all lawful strategies in order to achieve clients' objectives, even if those
strategies produce immoral or unjust results in particular cases.6 In
contrast, critics of the dominant view have offered several competing
visions, arguing that lawyers should seek justice or morally acceptable
outcomes rather than simply pursue clients' interests.7 There is a clear
relationship between these ethics theories and representational rules, like
the duty of confidentiality, and ethicists have explored that relationship in
great detail
Despite the obvious applicability of ethics theories to representational
rules, theorists have not extensively explored the possible implications of
the theories for structural regulations. Consider a Florida rule that forbids
plaintiffs' lawyers (but not defense lawyers) from contacting accident
victims or their families in any way, including by mail, within thirty days
of an accident.9 The United States Supreme Court recently upheld this rule
5. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS
79-125 (2d ed. 2002); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 177-205 (1988);
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 54-62 (1998);
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060, 1060-61 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
6. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 5, at 1060-61; Pepper, supra note 5, at 624-27.
7. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5, at 202-05; SIMON, supra note 5, at 9.
8. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5, at 148-54; Pepper, supra note 5, at 613-15.
9. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
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against a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that the legal
profession's image required the protection that the rule afforded.' ° Many
commentators have weighed in on the issue, but their arguments rarely
draw on conventional ethics theories." The absence of these theories is
surprising because they have distinct and progressive implications for
structural rules like Florida's letter solicitation provision. The dominant
view, for example, suggests that the analysis should focus on whether
letter solicitations within thirty days of an accident would enhance the
representation that clients receive. From this perspective, the Florida rule
is undesirable in that it might allow valuable, fresh evidence to go
uncollected; 2 it also might permit defense lawyers to obtain defensefavorable settlement agreements before prospective plaintiffs hire an
attorney.' 3 The dominant view, in other words, would shift the focus of the
debate away from the profession's image and toward concerns that are
more consistent with the profession's theories of representational rules.
Critics of the dominant view, however, might focus on the extent to which
the rule enhances the prospects for just or morally acceptable results. Such
an analysis might also suggest that the rule is undesirable; specifically, it
affects a lawyer's ability to protect a prospective client against defensefavorable tactics, thus creating the possibility of an unjust result.
One could identify a number of competing arguments using standard
ethics theories as the analytical framework, but the point here is more
basic: if we believe that lawyers should care about concepts like justice or
client-centered representation when making decisions in the context of
individual cases, we should not bracket those convictions when the debate
turns to issues of broader structural concern. Bracketing, however, is too
often what the profession has done. Of course, commentators have
discussed structural issues in considerable detail, but they have done so
without sufficient reference to the theories that lie at the heart of
discussions about representational rules. This Article, in short, seeks to
bridge the gap that has developed between ethics theories and structural
rules.
Part II describes in more detail the dichotomy between structural and
representational regulations. The suggestion is that, although lawyers tend
to lump their self-regulatory efforts under the general rubric of
professional responsibility, one can discern two distinct categories within
10. Id. at 624-35.
11. For one exception, see FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 329-32, which makes the
argument that aggressive solicitation is consistent with the premises of the dominant view.
12. See id.; cf Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism,Legal Advertising, andFree Speech in
the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 721 (1997).
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the rubric. On the one hand, the profession has promulgated
representational rules, such as conflict of interest and confidentiality
provisions, that govern attorney conduct in the context of law practice. On
the other hand, attorneys have created rules more properly characterized
as structural regulations. These provisions, such as the thirty day
solicitation rule 4 and limitations on non-lawyer practice, 5 affect the
contours of the legal profession itself and the ways in which lawyers
conduct the business aspects of their practices.
Part III contends that the profession has not adopted a theory that
successfully unifies our understanding of structural and representational
rules. Instead, it has bifurcated its treatment of professional responsibility
rules by referring to conventional models, like the dominant view and its
critics, in the context of representational regulations and by adopting two
relatively undeveloped objectives in the context of structural rules. First,
the profession has sought to enhance the public's perception of lawyers in
order to ensure confidence in the justice system as a whole. 6 The
profession's second objective, which lawyers have referred to much less
explicitly but have relied upon equally, is that structural
regulations should
17
protect the bar's power and economic interests.
Part IV contends that the bar's two structural objectives are
unsatisfactory. The first goal is empirically flawed because it relies on the
unproven and increasingly dubious premise that a positive image of the bar
is necessary to achieve confidence in the justice system. The second goal
is more obviously deficient; namely, protectionism does not serve as a
compelling justification for regulations. 8 Although numerous scholars
have observed that the bar's regulations are self-interested and imageoriented, 9 Part IV suggests that these biases emerge most frequently in the
structural context, where we find the rules with greatest relevance to the
legal profession's financial well-being. Finally, Part IV contends that,
although the profession frequently relies on consumer protection as the
justification for many structural rules, the more self-interested motivations
14. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2002).
16. See infra Part III.B. This emphasis is unsurprising given how seriously lawyers take the
profession's public image. See DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (2000) (observing that when lawyers are "asked to identify the most
important problems facing the profession, [they] consistently have put public image.., at the top
of the list").
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See, e.g., RHODE, supranote 16, at 6, 8 (noting the problematic role of self-interest in the
bar's regulatory efforts).
19. See, e.g., id.; see also Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702, 706-07 (1977).
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of image and protectionism appear to have had a greater impact on the
content of structural regulations.
In light of these problems, Part V suggests that the profession should
jettison its current approaches to structural regulations and instead unify
representational and structural theory through the use of conventional
models like the dominant view and its critics. Part V examines possible
objections to this approach, including the idea that consumer protection
should serve as the unifying theme, and concludes that traditional ethics
models offer the most appealing theoretical vision for structural rules.
Part VI turns to the task of tracing the implications of contemporary
theory for topics of structural concern. Through an analysis of key
structural issues-client solicitation provisions, unauthorized practice
laws, and multidisciplinary practice rules-it becomes apparent that
conventional theories can make a significant contribution to debates about
these often controversial subjects. Interestingly, this analysis also reveals
that, although ethics models contain different prescriptions at the level of
individual lawyer behavior (such as the scope of the duty of
confidentiality), they are surprisingly unified in their analysis of structural
regulations. In particular, the analysis confirms what many commentators
have already concluded through alternative arguments: that the bar is
frequently too slow in adopting important reforms. This Article, therefore,
ultimately offers a unique justification for progressive reforms, arguing
that the foot-dragging so frequently observed in the bar is actually
inconsistent with the premises of prevailing ethics theories.
II. CATEGORIZING PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS

Although commentators typically refer to professional rules
generically,2 ° it is possible to identify two distinct types of ethics
regulations: representational rules and structural rules. The essence of the
distinction is that representational rules govern how a lawyer must
represent a client, such as prohibiting the presentation of perjured
testimony or preventing conflicts of interest. In contrast, structural
regulations, like limitations on advertising and rules against
multidisciplinary practices, dictate how a lawyer conducts "the business
of law."
Representational regulations refer to the type of rules that most lawyers
and scholars think of when they discuss professional responsibility.
20. For two exceptions to this general rule, see Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We
Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis ofthe Justificationfor Entry andConduct Regulation,
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 432 (2001), which distinguishes between entry and conduct regulations, and
Morgan, supra note 19, at 707, which identifies four distinct types of rules.
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Specifically, representational provisions govern how lawyers act in the
context of the lawyer-client relationship. For instance, regulations relating
to the duty of confidentiality, 2 conflicts of interest,22 client or witness
perjury,2 3 candor to the tribunal,24 terminating the lawyer-client
relationship,25 and communications with witnesses26 all set out limitations
on what a lawyer may do when representing a particular client.
Structural regulations, in contrast, govern the very framework of the
legal profession. Unlike representational regulations, these rules do not
dictate how lawyers represent their clients; rather, they create the
professional structure within which attorneys practice. Consider
unauthorized practice laws. These provisions define the practice of law
and thus set limits on the law-related services that non-attorneys can
offer.27 They also place constraints on the work that out-of-state attorneys
can perform within a particular state (i.e., they place limits on
multijurisdictional practice). As a result, these laws govern a key area of
concern regarding the legal profession's framework. Rules regarding
multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) also have structural implications in
that they regulate the types of business arrangements that lawyers can
forge with non-lawyers.28 Advertising restrictions are yet another form of
structural regulation; they dictate how lawyers obtain their clients rather
than explaining how lawyers service their existing clients.29 Even rules
relating to bar admissions and graduation requirements qualify as
structural because they define what members of the profession must learn
in order to practice law.3"
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
22. Id. R. 1.7-1.10.

23. Id. R. 3.3(a)(4), 3.3(c).
24. See, e.g., id. R. 3.3(a)(1), (a)(3), 3.3(d).
25. Id. R. 1.16.
26. Id. R. 4.2-4.3.
27. As discussed in greater depth in Part VI, infra, unauthorized practice laws prohibit two
types of conduct: non-lawyers practicing law and attorneys practicing law in a state where they are
not licensed to do so.
28. See articles cited supra note 2. Currently, the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibit MDPs, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2002), though
an ABA Commission recently made an unsuccessful proposal to permit them. COMM'N ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note I (offering a proposal, ultimately rejected, that would
have allowed MDPs); see also Molly McDonough, D.C. Bar Votes Yes on MDP: Group Is
Undaunted by Enron Issues, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, May 31, 2002, at 4 (reporting the District of
Columbia Bar's Board of Governors' endorsement of MDPs). For the most recent information
about the status of MDPs in specificjurisdictions, see CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
A.B.A., MDP INFORMATION, athttp://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstatesumm.html (last visited Aug.
1,2002).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1-7.5 (2002).
30. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR
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Structural regulations not only differ substantively from
representational rules, but they also differ with respect to the sources of
their authority. In contrast to representational regulations, which are
typically found in state rules of professional conduct, structural rules are
more diverse in origin.3 1 State statutes often define what constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law; state bar organizations dictate bar admission
requirements; and the ABA sets out accreditation requirements for law
schools.32 Of course, the rules of professional conduct do touch on matters
of structural significance, such as MDPs and advertising,33 but the rules are
not the exclusive source of structural regulations.34
Ultimately, structural rules help to define the profession itself, as in the
case of unauthorized practice laws, graduation requirements, and rules
against multidisciplinary practice, or explain how lawyers obtain their
clients, as in the case of lawyer advertising and solicitation. Despite the
wide range of subject matter, the rules share a common concern for
regulating the ways in which the legal profession conducts the business of
law. These types of rules, in other words, do not dictate how lawyers
should represent their clients, but rather set the stage upon which lawyers
perform for those clients.
The structural and representational categories are not without their
ambiguities. Regulations relating to the attorney-disciplinary process, for
example, have features resembling both types of rules. On the one hand,
disciplinary processes and lawyers' knowledge of them can have a direct
impact on the way that lawyers interact with their clients, and are thus
similar to representational rules. On the other hand, the disciplinary system
can be used to enforce structural regulations, such as unauthorized practice
laws, so in that sense, the disciplinary rules have a structural character as
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 301-07 (2002)

[hereinafter SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND

ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR].

31. This diversity might explain why ethicists have tended to focus on representational rules.
Those rules have a clearer source of legal authority and are thus more easily identifiable as sources
of concern for courses and commentaries on legal ethics.
32. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, supra note 30.
33. Of late, even representational regulations have begun to appear outside of the Model
Rules. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission is in the process of narrowing the
duty of confidentiality for lawyers practicing before the Commission in response to recent corporate
scandals. SEC Must Issue Attorney Conduct Rules Under New FederalAccounting Reform Law,
71 U.S.L.W. 2079, 2079 (2002).
34. Interestingly, the profession seems to accept that non-lawyers should have a role in
creating structural rules, such as legislative enactments regarding unauthorized practice, but lawyers
do not have the same degree ofacceptance when it comes to representational rules. The recent furor
over the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC's related regulation of attorney confidentiality might
have resulted, at least in part, from the profession's perception that representational rules should
remain within the control of lawyers.
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well. Despite these ambiguities, a great many professional regulations can
be readily categorized as either representational or structural.
These groupings make sense, but one might wonder what purpose they
serve. As an initial matter, the representational/structural dichotomy is a
useful device for conceptualizing professional regulations. That is, the
dichotomy helps us understand the different types of professional rules and
how they relate to the work that attorneys perform." Second, and more
importantly, the categories shed light on a gap in the premises that underlie
representational and structural rules. As Part III makes clear, the premises
underlying many structural rules have remained largely unexamined and
do not reflect the rich theoretical development that representational rules
have received.
III. THE BIFURCATION OF ETHICS THEORY
Despite the existence of two distinct types of professional rules, most
theories of legal ethics have tended to focus on representational
regulations. Part III.A. identifies this focus through an explanation of
existing ethics theories. Part III.B. then examines the underlying premises
of structural regulations and concludes that, instead of relying on
conventional models for theoretical insights, two unappealing objectives
have evolved: the enhancement of the profession's image and the
protection of the profession's economic interests. Of course, numerous
commentators have noted that the profession relies on self-interested
objectives rather than on the often-stated intention to protect consumers.36
Part III.B., however, makes the case that the profession's self-interested
behavior manifests itself most clearly at the structural level.
A. Theories of RepresentationalRules
To appreciate legal ethics theories' traditional focus on representational
rules, consider the classic case of Spauldingv. Zimmerman.3' The lawsuit
35. It is also worth elucidating this distinction in professional responsibility classes,
especially since most courses tend to focus on representational regulations.
36. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 16 (1989); RHODE, supra note 16, at
16; Morgan, supra note 19, at 704.
37. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). A number of law review articles have examined this case.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1998); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling
at the Limits ofthe Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudenceand Ethics ofLawyering, 104 YALE L.J.

1545, 1606 (1995). Many legal ethics casebooks discuss it as well. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 5-13 (3d ed. 1999); THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 474-75 (7th

ed. 1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 220-26 (3d ed. 2001). Even a
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involved a minor, David Spaulding, who sustained injuries in a car
accident.3" During the litigation, defense counsel's medical expert
discovered that David suffered more severe injuries than his own lawyers
suspected: David had a life-threatening aneurysm that required immediate
medical attention.39 David's doctors had missed the diagnosis, so even
David did not know the severity of his own condition.4" Based on what the
defense lawyers knew at the time, 4 they faced the troubling dilemma of
pursuing their client's interests-not disclosing the condition and settling
the case for a nominal amount-or saving David's life.42
Conventional theories have crafted a wide range of approaches to
morally vexing cases like Spaulding. For instance, the dominant view of
legal ethics,43 which favors unwavering commitment to clients even if that
commitment produces immoral or unjust results,44 suggests that
Zimmerman's lawyers, who did not disclose the condition, acted
ethically.45 Theories critical of the dominant view, which posit that lawyers
should consider non-client interests like justice or morality when making
popular television show created an episode modeled on Spaulding. The Practice: Honor Code
(ABC television broadcast, Nov. 18, 2001).
38. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 706.
39. Id. at 707.
40. Id. at 707-08.
41. It turns out that, although the lawyers did not disclose the injury, David fortuitously
discovered the problem himself when he had a checkup a short time after the case settled. Id. at
708. The checkup "was required by the army reserve, of which [David] was a member." Id.
42. Interestingly, the opinion does not reveal whether defense counsel consulted with the
defendant, Zimmerman (a friend of the Spauldings and the driver of the car in which David was
a passenger) to see if Zimmerman would have agreed to the disclosure. Id. at 706-07. Recent
scholarship suggests that the conversation never occurred and that Zimmerman's insurance
company also may not have known about the issue. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 37, at 69.
Thus, the defense lawyers apparently decided not to disclose the information on their own, raising
a host of ethics issues beyond the scope of this article. Id.; Pepper, supra note 37, at 1606.
43. Professor Simon uses this term, but other monikers include "the full advocacy model, the
standard conception, the traditional conception, and (less charitably) the hired gun." Rob Atkinson,
Lawyeringin Law's Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1507 n.7 (1999) (reviewing SIMON, supranote
5); see also RHODE& LUBAN, supranote 37, at 137-49 (calling the position the neutral partisanship
model); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 8 (1999) (referring to the dominant view as the regulatory model).
44. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 5, at 1080-87; Pepper, supra note 5, at 614.
45. Until recently, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct actually prohibited
disclosure in this type of case. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (pre-2002 version)
(prohibiting disclosure unless the client consents or the client is about to commit a criminal or
fraudulent act that would cause injury). Thus, absent client consent, the defense lawyers not only
acted ethically under one recent version of the duty of confidentiality; it was the only action that
the rules permitted. Professor Pepper has added one important proviso: the lawyers should have
consulted with their client and tried to convince the client to consent to disclosure. Pepper, supra
note 37, at 1606.
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professional judgments,46 suggest that Zimmerman's lawyers should have
disclosed David's condition even if Zimmerman had not wanted his
lawyers to do so. 47 In short, conventional ethics theories have obvious

applications to questions of individual lawyer behavior, and the literature
has explored these applications in rich detail. The following discussion
offers an overview of these ethics theories and notes-their focus on
representational rules.
1. The Dominant View
The dominant view consists essentially of two concepts: the principles
of nonaccountability and partisanship. 4 The nonaccountability principle
simply states that the public should not hold lawyers morally accountable
for their choices of clients and tactics. 49 The partisanship principle posits
a related idea, asserting that lawyers should undertake all lawful actions
that best serve their clients' interests, even if those actions are contrary to
the interests of justice or morality in specific cases."0 These principles
further many objectives, perhaps the most important of which is client
autonomy; 5 namely, by following the wishes of a client and not sacrificing
those wishes on the altar of morality or some conception of justice,
dominant view adherents believe that we honor an individual's freedom
of choice. 2
As one might suspect, the dominant view has clear implications for
representational rules. For example, adherents of the dominant view (and
its concomitant partisanship principle) conclude that a lawyer does not act
unethically by failing to disclose information that could adversely affect
a third party. From this perspective, the defense lawyers in Spauldingdid
not act unethically by failing to disclose the boy's medical condition even
46. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5, at 154-58; SIMON, supra note 5, at 8-9.
47. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5, at 149-54.
48. LUBAN, supra note 5, at I1; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 150 (David Luban ed., 1983).

49. SIMON, supra note 5, at 8; Fried, supra note 5, at 1078; Pepper, supra note 5, at 617.
50. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 282 (1991); Fried, supra note 5, at 1066; Pepper, supra note 5, at 614.
51. For prominent examples of this emphasis, see FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 5658, Fried, supra note 5, at 1073, and Pepper, supra note 5, at 616-17. See also William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice andClient Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, in ETHICS INPRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 165 n.I (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) (citing numerous

scholars who have identified client autonomy as a key issue in lawyering); Fred C. Zacharias,
Limits on ClientAutonomy in Legal EthicsRegulation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 199, 199 (2001) (observing
that "[Iegal ethics proceeds from the assumption that client autonomy is a good thing and
paternalism towards clients is bad").
52. See Fried, supra note 5, at 1073.
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though that decision could have resulted in the boy's death. Because the
attorneys had a duty only to their client and the client did not seek any
unlawful ends or illegal means, the lawyers did not act improperly. In a
similar fashion, proponents of the dominant view have explored other
topics covered by representational rules, such as conflicts of interest and
client perjury. 53 The dominant view, therefore, has clear consequences for
representational rules, and commentators have written extensively about
that relationship.
What dominant view proponents have done less well is to explore in
depth the implications oftheir position for structural regulations. Professor
Monroe Freedman is perhaps the most prominent advocate of the
partisanship principle,54 and he has set out a "systematic position on
lawyers' ethics" in one of his books." Freedman explores the significance
of his position for a number of professional regulations, including the
making of frivolous arguments, 56 conflicts of interest,"7 the duty of
confidentiality," and perjury,5 9 among others. But Freedman spends

significant time on only one structural issue (client solicitation rules) 6° and
does little to address other structural regulations. Professor Freedman's
work is typical in this regard; one finds little discussion of the dominant
view's applicability to structural rules in the literature.

53. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 257-58 (describing the dominant view
perspective on conflicts); Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some
Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1988) (moderating his earlier views on client
perjury); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of Criminal Defense Lawyers: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (sketching out a radical view of client
perjury). Interestingly, Professor Freedman believes that there should be an exception to the duty
of confidentiality in cases where someone's life is at stake. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at
146-47. Professor Abbe Smith, another proponent of the dominant view, is arguably more
consistent on this point and rejects the idea that the rules should permit a lawyer's disclosure of
confidential information under these circumstances. Id. at 147.
54. Professor Freedman, though an advocate of the partisanship principle, is less fond of the
nonaccountability principle. Id. at 82 (asserting that "It]he lawyer's decision to accept or reject a
client is a moral decision for which the lawyer can properly be held morally accountable").
55. Id. at vii.
56. Id. at 93 (arguing that "[o]ne of the most serious threats to zealous advocacy is the
imposition of sanctions against lawyers who file pleadings or make arguments that are deemed to
be 'frivolous"').
57. Id. at 255-56 (describing how conflicts can adversely affect a lawyer's zealousness).
58. Id. at 127-28 (contending that the duty of confidentiality is a critical component of
effective assistance of counsel).
59. Id. at 153-90.
60. Id.at 329-61.
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2. Critics of the Dominant View
Theorists have offered a number of different critiques of the dominant
view,6 but the critics generally share the goal of developing a competing
vision of ethics infused with some form of judgment that considers nonclient interests. Specifically, critics typically refer to two methods for
giving substance to professional judgments: morality and social values.62
Professor David Luban presents one of the most commonly cited versions
of a morality-based theory of ethics.63 According to Luban, lawyers should
seek morally worthy ends using morally justifiable means (at least outside
the criminal defense context).64 From this perspective, the lawyers in
Spaudlingacted unethically because they failed to place sufficient weight
on the moral consequences of their failure to disclose the plaintiff's
injuries.
In contrast to morality-based theories of ethics, some models identify
faults with the dominant view yet find it troubling to allow lawyers to
make professional decisions using common morality.65 Professor William
Simon has constructed one of the most compelling and thorough of such
models, which posits that "[l]awyers should take those actions that,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely
to promote justice."" Byjustice, Simon does not refer to common morality
but to "legal judgments grounded in the methods and sources of authority
' Lawyers, according to this view, should not
of the professional culture."67
pursue their own unique conception of justice or morality, but should be
guided by an understanding of justice that is consistent with the legal
culture's understanding of the concept. Like Luban, Simon would also find
that the lawyers in Spauldingshould have disclosed the plaintiff's injuries,
but Simon would justify that conclusion on the grounds that the result
would have been consistent with the prevailing legal notions ofjustice.

61. Pepper, supra note 5, at 614-15 n.7 (citing critiques of the neutral partisanship model
based on moral philosophy, religion, socioeconomic analysis, legal analysis, and jurisprudence).
62. See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 75, 89-90 (2000). Unfortunately, the discussion here does not do justice to
the wonderfully rich and powerful set of dominant view critiques. The debate between these two
positions is beyond the scope of this Article.
63. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 5.
64. Id. at xxii; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & R.F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER
(1981).
65. See Crystal, supra note 62, at 90-91 (citing Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice
as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REv. 255 (1990)); Wendel, supra note 43, at 7.
66. SIMON, supra note 5, at 138.
67. Id.
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As is the case with dominant view advocates, prominent dominant view
critics also fail to fully explore the structural aspects of their theories.
Professor Simon, for example, develops a rich and powerful critique of the
dominant view but ultimately emphasizes issues relating to
representational rules. He writes: "The kind of moral decisions that
implicate the profession's most fundamental commitments to legality and
justice are those that arise from conflicts between client interests on the
one hand and third-party and public interests on the other., 61 Simon, in
other words, believes that the most important issues for legal ethicists
relate to how lawyers represent specific clients. This focus is apparent in
the examples that Simon develops early in his book and returns to
throughout the work.69 All of the hypotheticals place a lawyer in a
situation of having to choose between the client's objectives and the
interests of justice. What Simon does not explore are issues-like
unauthorized practice, advertising, multidisciplinary practice, or even legal
education-that have important implications for how lawyers behave in
the context of his hypotheticals. As a result, he does not consider the
structural dimensions of the issues he seeks to address. In fairness, Simon
does discuss structural concerns, but of a somewhat different variety;
namely, Simon examines how the regulatory and disciplinary structure of
the profession should operate.7 ° Though interesting and compelling, the
discussion does not examine the crucial structural controversies-like
MJP, non-lawyer practice, and MDP-that the profession currently faces,
and so Simon's discussion is unnecessarily limited in its breadth.
As with Simon's work, Professor Luban's seminal book, Lawyers and
Justice: An EthicalStudy,7 develops a powerful critique of the dominant
view and then explains how the critique plays out in the context of specific
representation rules, such as the duty of confidentiality, conflicts of
interest, and the prohibition against presenting false testimony. Unlike
Simon, Luban does address some issues of structural concern, such as
access to justice and its relationship to the unauthorized practice of law."
Luban's conclusions, however, do not draw on his critiques of the
dominant view. Rather, Luban starts with the assumption that the
government's legitimacy depends on the concept of equality. 73 He then
reasons that equality requires access to the legal system and that access, in

68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 4-6, 29, 41-42.
70. Id. at 195-215.

71.

LUBAN,

supra note 5.

72. Id. at 237-39.
73. Id. at 244.
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turn, often requires the availability of legal advice.74 Luban concludes that
we should therefore liberalize unauthorized practice laws and expand
resources for traditional legal aid.75
Largely absent from Luban's analysis is an application of his theory of
lawyer behavior to the question of access. Luban overlooks the moral
dimension of the issue because he too quickly assumes that the question
of unauthorized practice has no moral component; namely, he concludes
that a lay person has no moral right to receive legal services.76 In reaching
this conclusion, Luban appears to look at the morality of the issue from the
wrong end of the lawyer-client relationship. Rather than asking whether
lay people have a moral right to a lawyer in civil cases, Luban should have
examined-as he does earlier in his book-the moral obligation of the
legal profession. That is, he should have asked whether lawyers have a
moral right to the monopoly they maintain over legal services. As will be
explained in greater detail in Part VI, the latter question is more consistent
with the theory he develops because it focuses on the legal profession's
moral obligations rather than the client's moral rights. It also ensures a
more uniform treatment of the issues he discusses in his book, bringing
them back to a single theory of the legal profession.77 In short, Luban does
consider access to justice issues such as the unauthorized practice of law,
but the analysis does not draw on his underlying critique of the dominant
view.
Professor Deborah Rhode, another leading legal ethics scholar, recently
published a compelling book that touches on both ethics theory and many
structural themes,7" but her discussions of the two topics, like Luban's,
appear relatively disconnected. For example, Professor Rhode identifies
several guiding principles for professional reform. 9 The first principle
relates to ethics theory, and the second principle relates to structural
questions.8 " Despite recognizing these two distinct areas of professional
74. Id. Luban correctly argues that the appropriate source of the legal advice (i.e., lawyer
versus non-lawyer) should differ depending on the content of the legal matter. Id. at 269-70.
75. Id.; see also David Luban, MandatoryPro Bono: A Workable (and Moral) Plan, 64
MICH. B.J. 280 (1985).
76. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 248-49.
77. Luban's analysis, despite addressing access issues, contains only a brief mention (or no
mention at all) of other key structural questions, such as lawyer advertising, MJP, and MDP.
Granted, MJP and MDP have become more controversial in recent years (after Luban wrote his
book), but Luban has not applied his analysis to these issues in much of his subsequent work. But
see David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 839 (1999) (discussing the effect
of MDPs on Luban's ideal conception of the lawyers' role).
78. See RHODE, supra note 16.
79. Id. at 17-19.

80. Id.
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interest, Professor Rhode does not examine how (or if) her two principles
are related. This approach is reflected throughout her book; the discussion
of ethics theory appears early in the book,8 ' separate from structural issues
like advertising and unauthorized practice, which appear later.82 So, even
though her analyses of the latter issues are wonderfully trenchant because
of her deft use of empirical evidence and policy arguments, Professor
Rhode's discussion of structural issues does not ultimately draw on the
ethics theories she earlier describes.
Finally, Professor Richard Abel has discussed many important features
of the legal profession in his book, American Lawyers.83 His focus,
however, was primarily on how lawyers created a profession rather than
on the specific rules that govern the business of law.84 Moreover, when
Professor Abel does discuss structural rules, such as advertising and MJP,
he does not tie that discussion to the prevailing theories of legal ethics.85
Rather, the book filters the discussion of structural concerns through the
lens of three distinct theoretical traditions in sociology: "Weberian,
Marxist, and a structural-functional approach associated with Parsons but
rooted in Durkheim.' 86 This approach to understanding the genesis of
lawyer regulations and the profession more generally is obviously
essential, but it does not offer (and does not appear intended to offer) a
method for understanding the ideal content of the structural rules with
which this Article is most concerned.
In all, the conventional debate between the dominant view and its
critics, as well as the discussions about theories of professionalism, are
profoundly important. This literature, however, has given insufficient
attention to the implications of ethics theories for the structural rules that
constitute the other half of professional regulation.
B. P.R.: ProfessionalResponsibility as Public Relations and
ProtectionistRules (The Structural Objectives)
Unlike the complex theoretical discussions that have emerged in the
context of representational rules and professional sociology, ethicists have
not developed a theory to explain the appropriate content of structural
rules. Rather, at least two objectives have emerged, one more explicit than
the other. The first and more explicit goal is the fostering of confidence in
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 49-80.
Id. at 143-84.
ABEL, supra note 36.
Id. at 14.
See, e.g., id. at 119-22.
Id. at 15.
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lawyers in order to preserve trust in the justice system as a whole.
Structural regulations, according to this view, should enhance the
profession's image because a positive image is necessary to a sound
judicial system. The second and more implicit objective underlying many
structural rules is less altruistic and considerably more self-interested: the
protection of the bar's economic well-being. Of course, not all regulations
have these objectives and other regulations share these objectives only in
part. This section nonetheless contends, as many other commentators have
argued, 7 that the profession has pursued these goals more consistently
than other identifiable agendas, including consumer protection. The
following discussion adds to the already-existing literature by suggesting
that these concerns arise most often and clearly in the structural context.
This emphasis becomes apparent through an examination of the history of
bar associations, ethics rules, and legal education.
1. Professional Associations
Lawyers' attention to image and economic self-interest has its roots in
the history of the American bar.8" The profession experienced extensive
hostility for much of its infancy, so when the profession finally organized
itself after the Civil War into a structure that largely survives today,
lawyers took great pains to guard their image and protect their economic
well-being. Not only does this focus continue despite a much less pressing
need for it, but it has manifested itself in many of the profession's
structural rules.
As far back as colonial times, the bar experienced adversity in the form
of antagonistic legislation,89 with some early colonies going so far as to
outlaw the practice of law.9" One leading legal historian has noted quite
87. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 36.
88. I am mindful here not to represent this section as a piece of historical scholarship. As
Judge Posner has noted: "[T]he term 'law office history' is properly derisory and the derision
embraces the efforts ofjudges and law professors.., to play historian." Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160
F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated, in part, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, some
historical references are helpful in documenting the bar's attention to image and self-protection.
89. See, e.g., Francis Aumann, The ChangingAmericanLegalSystem, Some Selected Phases
19-26 (1940), reprintedin READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 31-33
(Dennis Nolan ed., 1980); 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
AMERICA 331 (1965); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 81 (1973);
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES, WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (1953);
Jonathon Rose, Medieval Attitudes Toward the Legal Profession: The Past As Prologue, 28
STETSON L. REV. 345, 365 (1998). In fact, even this long history of public disregard is understated;
the public's distaste for lawyers extends as far back as medieval times. Id. at 346.
90. FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 81-82; POUND, supranote 89, at 132. In some parts of the
colonies, lawyers at times barely resembled a profession at all. See, e.g., Alan F. Day, Lawyers in
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simply that "the lawyer was unloved in the 17th century." 9' The extreme
hostility for lawyers began to dissipate to some degree at the beginning of
the eighteenth century, 92 as the needs of a growing society made lawyers
more necessary. 93 Lawyers nonetheless continued to face animosity despite
the profession's growth and society's needs.94
Hostility continued even after the American Revolution."' One problem
was that many attorneys who had finally become established near the end
of the colonial era were loyalists and left the country after the
Revolution. Many of the remaining lawyers had little formal legal
training, and the freshness of the war with Britain left the public distrustful
of English law and of those who had knowledge of it.97 In fact, even
though lawyers made up about half of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence and at least half of the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, the public was suspicious of
lawyers.98 Indeed, many people who opposed the Constitution prior to its
ColonialMaryland, 1660-1715, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145 (1973), reprintedin READINGS INTHE
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supranote 89, at 40. The reasons for this hostility
are controversial, but the existence of the dislike is less so. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at
82.
91, FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 82.
92. See, e.g., Milton M. Klein, The Rise ofthe New York Bar: The Legal Careerof William
Livingston, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 334, 334 (1958), reprintedin READINGS INTHE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 89, at 52 (observing that "[o]n the eve of the
American Revolution, the legal profession in New York possessed both social prestige and political
power"); Charles McKirdy, Before the Storm: The Working Lawyer in Pre-Revolutionary
Massachusetts, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 46, 46 (1976), reprintedin READINGS INTHE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supranote 89, at 47 (noting the extent to which the profession
had become socially accepted by the middle of the eighteenth century).
93. FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 83-84.
94. Id. at 82-84.
95. POUND, supranote 89, at 177-78; CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
212 (1911); Rose, supranote 89, at 365. But see Dennis R. Nolan, The Effect of the Revolution on
the Bar-The Maryland Experience, 62 VA. L. REV. 969, 971 (1976) (finding that the oft-cited
thesis of Warren and Pound about the post-Revolution bar did not apply in Maryland). Even if the
validity of the Pound/Warren thesis is doubtful, as Professor Nolan suggests, there is little question
that the profession at least suffered growing pains during the nation's early years and that some of
the former colonies expressed hostility toward lawyers.
96. 2 CHROUST, supranote 89, at 281; FRIEDMAN, supranote 89, at 88,265; WARREN, supra
note 95, at 212-13. But see Erwin Surrency, The Lawyer and the Revolution, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
125 (1964), reprintedin READINGS INTHE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra
note 89, at 78 (concluding that, although "more than 130 lawyers left the colonies during the
Revolution or by the end of the war, a sufficient body of able lawyers remained to re-establish the
profession").
97. POUND, supra note 89, at 177; WARREN, supra note 95, at 214.
98. Milton M. Klein, New York Lawyers and the Coming of the American Revolution, 55
N.Y. HIST. 383 (1974), reprinted in READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 89, at 85. Given the important role that lawyers played during and after
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ratification did so on the grounds that it "'was the work of lawyers."' 99 A
widespread depression after the Revolution also fostered resentment, as
many attorneys took on the unpopular role of debt collectors." 0 Even the
Supreme Court did not receive considerable public support; in 1800, when
President John Adams asked John Jay to resume his former position as
Chief Justice, Jay refused. Jay reasoned that the Court did not have "the
public confidence and respect which, as the last resort of justice of the
nation, it should."''
A number of lawyer associations developed in the early 1800s, and by
the time Alexis de Tocqueville made his famous visit to America in the
early part of the century, de Tocqueville believed that lawyers "form[ed]
the only enlightened class whom the people do not mistrust. '' Lawyer
associations, however, quickly dissolved during a time that Roscoe Pound
has called "The Era of Decadence."'0 3 During this period, from the 1830s
until around 1870, the profession experienced a particularly deep
breakdown in organization, education, and professional training."
the Revolution, the distrust at that time is surprising. In fact, it is so surprising as to prompt one
commentator to mark it as one of the "more curious" developments in American legal history.
WARREN, supra note 95, at 212. Perhaps the answer lies in the depth of the distaste for lawyers.

That is, the hostility toward the legal profession may be akin to distasteful vegetables; people may
not like them, but the public realizes that they have many redeeming qualities. This seeming
contradiction between having political power and being the subject of public hostility exists today
as well. Although a significant percentage of political leaders today have had legal training, the
public continues to express distrust of lawyers.
99. WARREN, supra note 95, at 218.
100. FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 265; POUND, supra note 89, at 179; WARREN, supra note
95, at 214.
101.

William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: The First HundredYears Were the Hardest,

42 U.MIAMI L. REV. 475, 477 (1988).
102. LAWYERS' ETHICS 8 (Allan Gerson ed., 1980) (quoting ALEXIS DE

TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835)). But see RHODE& LuBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 37, at 23-

24 (suggesting that there is some evidence that de Tocqueville overstated the respect that lawyers
received during this period).
103. POUND, supra note 89, at 232-49. Interestingly, Dean Pound's book itself, which
documented a survey of the bar in the early 1950s, manifested a concern for public confidence. He
wrote:

The legal profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public servants. They are
the stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of all the citizens. It is
incumbent on stewards, if they are to be faithful to their trust, to render an
accounting from time to time. This Survey is an honest effort to make a complete
audit and report for submission to the American people.
Id.at vii.
104. See, e.g., 2 CHROUST, supra note 89, at 165-66, 171; POUND, supra note 89, at 232-33.
Some recent scholarship pegs the end date around 1850. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION INAMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 10 (1983). But see id. at 8-9 (offering a
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Given the profession's checkered history, lawyers sought ways to
change their image and enhance their professional stature. With these
objectives in mind and with the Civil War behind them, lawyers founded
both the Bar Association for the City of New York in 1870 and the
American Bar Association in 1878.105 In the case of the Bar Association
for the City ofNew York, lawyers noted their commitment to "sustain[ing]
the profession in its proper position in the community."'0 6 The Bar's
constitution consequently set out, among other goals, the intention "'to
maintain the honor and dignity of the profession.""011 7 William Maxwell

Everts, one of the leaders of the American Bar at the time and a pivotal
figure in the establishment of the New York City Association, commented
that the group would
attempt to "'restore the honor, integrity, and fame of
08
the profession."",1

Although these comments reflected to some degree the confidencesapping scandals of the Tweed administration in New York,' 0 9 the usage
of strikingly similar wording by bar founders around the country implied
a broader concern for image and self-protection. The American Bar
Association, for example, which was founded just nine years later,
included a provision in its constitution that it would, inter alia, "uphold the
honor of the profession of law."" 0 One author who has examined the
ABA's history has noted that one objective of the ABA was to remove the
"latent hostility toward the ...

profession.""' Lawyers also organized

dozens of bar associations around the country, frequently declaring their
commitment to "'maintaining the honor and dignity of the profession.""' 2
In short, lawyers had encountered widespread distrust during their early
more optimistic view of the legal profession's status in the early 19th century); Maxwell
Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics: The Self-Image of the American Bar (1830-1860), 12 AM. J. LEGAL.
HisT. 306,308 (1968), reprintedin THE LEGAL PROFESSION: MAJOR HISTORICALINTERPRETATIONS

91 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (casting doubt on the conventional view of the profession in the 19th
century).
105. POUND, supra note 89, at 249.
106. Id. at 255 (emphasis omitted).

107.. Id. at 256.
108. Id. at 258-59; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 34 (1986)
(noting that "[tlhe purpose of the ABA was, and for most of its life has remained, that of raising

the economic and social status of lawyers and particularly of its members").
109. FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 561-62.
110. 1 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 30 (1878).
111. GERALD CARSON, A GOOD DAY AT SARATOGA 12 (1978). The ABA has more recently
set out a list of goals, and although the list does not contain an explicit reference to the profession's
image, many of the goals, such as "increas[ing] public understanding of and respect for... the role

of the legal profession," certainly share the concerns of previous bar leaders. A.B.A. POLICY AND
PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 2 (2002).

112. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 89, at 263, 264, 267-68, 285, 286, 291, 297-99.
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years, so the attorneys who founded modem bar associations set out-at
least in part-to avoid the profession's turbulent past by creating a positive
public image'' 3 and by protecting the profession's economic interests."' 4
The bar's focus on impressions and self-protection in the late
nineteenth century appears understandable given the historical context, but
one finds that these emphases continue within today's bar associations and
related entities. With respect to image, one commentator has noted the
continued wide-spread belief that "bar associations should.., be urgently
concerned about what clients and the general public think of lawyers.""' 5
Indeed, one recent president of the ABA dedicated his term to improving
the profession's negative image, going so far as to launch a one million
dollar public relations campaign." 6 Even more recently, the National
Conference of Bar Presidents, an organization of former and present bar
leaders that educates bar associations, began its Professional Reform
Initiative (PRI). PRI's goal is to "reestablish[] public trust and confidence
in the justice system.""' PRI has assumed that, to achieve this goal, it must
focus on improving lawyer "truthfulness and honesty," which the group
identifies as "the profession's core values.""' 8 Its premise is that the
profession must focus on the public's perception of lawyers in order to
ensure that the "system [does not] descend into a spiral of mistrust and
inefficiency."" 9 Similarly, the ABA Commission on Advertising recently
stated a similar assumption, positing that "[p]ublic confidence in the
113. One could attribute the focus on image to a number of causes, only one of which was the
profession's difficult history. The point, however, is not to identify the specific causes of the
emphasis on perceptions but to demonstrate how the bar has been and continues to be concerned
about public impressions.
114. See, e.g., Kermit L. Hall, Introductionto THE LEGAL PROFESSION: MAJOR HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 104, at xiii (noting the role that self-interest played in the
professionalization of the bar in the latter half of the 19th century).
115. SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE
END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 140 (1994); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 34 (2002) ("Bar associations often believe that one of their
primary missions is to improve the popular perception of lawyers.").
116. Randall Samborn, ABA Meeting Features Trial Publicity Debate, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8,
1994, at A6 (describing the outgoing ABA president's focus on "efforts to improve the public's
poor image of lawyers"); Saundra Torry, A Million-DollarCampaignto Love the Lawyers, WASH.
POST, May 24, 1993, at F7 (explaining the ABA's efforts to enhance the profession's public image).
117. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers: Perception,
Reality, and the ProfessionalReform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REv. 527, 534 (2002). Mr. Hodes is the
Reporter for PRI. Id. at 527 n.*.
118. Id.at534.
119. Id. at 533-34. PRI is part of the larger "professionalism movement." See id. at 532 n. 17.
This movement, which has taken many forms and about which much has been written, has sought
to improve (among other things) lawyers' behavior. As with PRI, one of the reasons often cited for
this attention to lawyer behavior is systemic confidence.
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profession is essential in order to sustain our justice system."' The ABA
Commission and PRI are informative not only because of their focus on
professional image, but because they tie that image to confidence in the
system of justice.
The bar also has continued to support measures that promote the
profession's economic interests. As explained in more detail below, many
structural regulations have protectionism as an underlying premise. Indeed,
2
numerous commentators have noted that efforts to prevent MDPs,' 1
continued support for strict unauthorized practice laws, 22 and the rejection
of a more permissive approach to multijurisdictional practice 2 3 all
arguably reflect to varying degrees the profession's use of structural
regulations to protect the interests of the bar. Many of these commentators
have noted that the recent professionalism movement,124 with its focus on
improving lawyer behavior (e.g., lawyer conduct codes) and on redirecting
lawyer attention to professional conduct instead of mere financial reward,
also arguably has a self-interested quality.12 1 Of course, bar associations
always have addressed problems unrelated to their public image or
economic interests, and the present discussion should imply nothing to the
contrary. The critical point, though, is that image and economic well-being
are two dominant, recurring, and widely-acknowledged objects of
professional concern.
120. COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, A.B.A., LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS:
PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATION 3 (1995) [hereinafter COMM'N ON ADVERTISING]; see also
COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, A.B.A., REPORT ON THE SURVEY ON THE IMAGE OF LAWYERS IN
ADVERTISING app. C (1988) (contending that "undignified advertising can detract from the
public's ... respect for the justice system").
121. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPracticeand the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in
the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary
Practice, 55 Bus. LAW. 951, 974 (2000) (arguing that "[allthough defenders of the ban on fee
sharing have attempted to cloak their arguments in the rhetoric of 'professionalism,' 'lawyer's
independence,' and the 'public interest,' their goals are no different from any other trade union or
interest group pursuing economic protectionism").
122. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990) (criticizing the self-interested nature of unauthorized practice laws).
123. Morgan, supra note 19, at 725 (identifying the self-serving nature ofmultijurisdictional
practice rules).
124. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, A.B.A., "... INTHE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE" A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONALISM].

125. See ABEL, supra note 36, at 240-45; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 337
(identifying "professionalism" as "a euphemism for public image"); ROBERT L. NELSON ET AL.,
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 17-18 (1992) (citing MAGALI SARFATTl LARSON, THE
RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: TRANSFORMATIONS INTHE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1977) for
the proposition that professionalism serves the economic interests of professional elites).
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2. Ethics Regulations
Although the ethics literature recognizes the self-interested nature of
professional regulations, scholars have not often recognized that this
protectionism has tended to manifest itself most clearly in the context of
structural regulations. The following discussion makes clear that the
ABA's structural rules-the rules that have the most to do with the
business aspects of the profession-have emphasized self-protection and
public image at the expense of more appropriate emphases. It is not
necessarily the case that the bar has consciously sought these two
objectives, but there is ample evidence that ethics codes have, in fact,
126
advanced these goals more clearly than other identifiable objectives.
a. The Canons of Professional Ethics
Many scholars believe there is a "link between the making of
professional ethics codes and the making and maintenance of professional
associations,"' 127 so it should come as little surprise that the ABA began
crafting ethics codes not long after its creation. Given the bar's history, it
should also be unsurprising that the ABA's first ethics code-the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics-reflected a concern for image and
economic protection. In fact, the very work upon which the Canons were
based-George Sharswood's An Essay on Professional
129
Ethics128 -expressly identified image as an important consideration.
Sharswood also made the link, as the recent PRI and ABA Commission on
126. See, e.g,. ABEL, supra note 36, at 142 (noting that the legal profession has used selfregulation as a method for gaining competitive advantages); Morgan, supra note 19, at 739-40
(making a similar observation in the context of the Model Code). Of course, ethics rules serve many
purposes. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics:the Making ofthe Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 724-32 (1989) (describing the many
motivations of the Model Rules' drafters). That said, two of the most frequently relied upon
objectives are the maintenance of public trust and economic protectionism.
127. Schneyer, supra note 126, at 691. Schneyer goes on to say that "the ABA's primacy in
formulating the rules of legal ethics remains an important factor in maintaining its authority, if not
its membership." Id. at 692.
128. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (F.B. Rothman 1993) (1854).

It has become de rigueur-andnot without good reason-to begin a discussion of American legal
ethics codes with George Sharswood. It served as the model for Alabama's ethics code, which in
turn served as the model for the ABA's 1908 Canons of Legal Ethics. Russell G. Pearce,
Rediscoveringthe Republican Originsofthe LegalEthics Codes, 6 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 241, 24347(1992).
129. David Hoffman's RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD TO PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT, in A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836) is another frequently cited progenitor of
modem ethics rules. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal Profession: the Impact of Law
and Legal Theory: Forward,67 FORDHAM L. REv. 239, 244 (1999).
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Advertising still do, between respect for the profession and trust in the
justice system more generally. Sharswood wrote:
Counsel should ever remember how necessary it is for the
dignified and honorable administration ofjustice, upon which
the dignity and honor of their profession entirely depend, that
the courts and the members of the courts, should be regarded
with respect by the suitors and people; that on all occasions
of difficulty or danger to that department of government, they
should have the good opinion and confidence of the public on
their side. 30
Sharswood's emphasis on a polished professional image and its
relationship to systemic confidence emerged quite clearly in the ABA's
Canons. The preamble for the Canons posited that "[t]he future of the
Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure
and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the
motives ofthe members of our profession are such as to merit the approval
of all just men."13 ' Even judges subsequently recognized the role that the
Canons served; one court observed that "[t]he canons of professional
ethics must be enforced by the Courts and must be respected by members
of the Bar if we are to maintain public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the administration ofjustice."'' The Canons thus served as
a mechanism to confer credibility on the newly formed bar associations,
functioned as an important public relations tool for lawyers, and purported
to prevent systemic distrust.
In addition to their concern for image, the Canons also served elite bar
members' economic interests. 133 Jerold Auerbach, a prominent legal
historian, has found that the "Canons... served as a club against lawyers
whose clients were excluded from [upper-class urban] culture: especially
the urban poor, new immigrants, and blue-collar workers.... The Canons

reflected and reinforced an increasingly stratified profession.' ' 34 In a
similar vein, Professor Charles Wolfram has observed that "[t]he Canons
were not originally adopted in order to serve as a regulatory blueprint for
enforcement through disbarment and suspension actions. Instead, they
seem to have been a statement of professional solidarity-an assertion by
elite lawyers in the ABA of the legitimacy of their claim to professional
stature."' 135 Another commentator has noted that "[t]he rapid growth of the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

SHARSWOOD, supra note 128, at 62-63.
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS pmbl. (1908).
In re Meeker, 414 P.2d 862, 864 (N.M. 1966).
See, e.g., FREEDMAN& SMITH, supra note 5, at 3-4, 332-35.
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN

AMERICA 42, 51 (1976).
135. WOLFRAM, supra note 108, at 54.
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[ethics] Code movement appears to have coincided with a sense of siege
upon the part of the leadership of the profession which was concerned [in
part] about the increasing volley of attacks from outside [the
profession]."' 36 In short, the bar used the Canons to reinforce the power
and prestige of its elite members.
The emphasis on image and self-protection is apparent in specific
structural provisions of the Canons, most notably the rules relating to
lawyer advertising. 37 As for image, the ABA Canons set the tone for what
would be a persistent theme regarding advertising, stating that it was:
unprofessional to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements ....
or by personal communications
or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect
advertisements for professional employment such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged.., and all other like
self-laudation, offend the traditionsand lower the tone of our
profession and are reprehensible ....
3
The Canons tossed lawyers the tiniest of self-promotion bones, allowing
them only "professional cards" and "[p]ublication[s] in reputable law
lists.' ' 139 Less explicit in the advertising provisions but no less present were
the bar's attempts to protect its own interests, particularly from new
members of the profession who might encroach on business or cause a
reduction in fees. 4 ° Indeed, the people most hurt by restrictions on
advertising were not the established practitioners who drafted the
Canons.' 4 ' Rather, advertising restrictions hurt newcomers, an increasingly
large number of immigrants who were entering the American job market,
including the legal profession.' 42 Without advertising, such entrants had
difficulty competing with the more socially-connected members of the
bar. 143
Of course, the ABA had numerous reasons for creating the Canons, and
the present discussion is not intended to suggest anything to the contrary.
136. MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (1980).

137. There are other examples as well, such as the debate about contingency fees. AUERBACH,
supra note 134, at 44-47.
138. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 27 (1947) (emphasis added). Courts from this period
took a similar approach. See, e.g., Barton v. State Bar of Cal., 289 P. 818, 820 (Cal. 1930)
(expressing concern for public sentiment if lawyers were to advertise freely).
139. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 27 (1947).
140. AUERBACH, supra note 134, at 42-43.
141. Id.
142. See id.
at 95-96.
143. Id. at 42-43.
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Rather, the point-made by many commentators144 -is that protectionism
and self-aggrandizement were two of the more significant catalysts for the
Canons, including the key structural concern of lawyer advertising.
b. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The Canons' replacement, the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, also manifested a concern for professional image and
protectionism. The Model Code, like the Canons, made explicit its concern
for image and tied that concern to the objective of creating systemic
confidence. The Code's preamble observed that:
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society .... [I]n the last analysis it is the

desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his
profession and of the society which he serves that should
provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible
degree of ethical conduct. The possible145loss of that respect
and confidence is the ultimate sanction.
Given the preamble, the very first Canon in the Model Code should come
as little surprise. It commanded that "A Lawyer Should Assist in
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession." 46 And
the very last canon urged lawyers to "Avoid Even the Appearance of
Professional Impropriety."' 47 It specified that "[w]hen explicit ethical
guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency
of the legal system and the legal profession."'4 Noting that the "rules of
law require that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through
our legal system," the Canon stated that lawyers "should promote public
confidence in our system and in the legal profession."' 49 The Canon, like
the preamble, also tied the profession's image to the fate of the legal
system more generally, stating that: "Public confidence in law and lawyers
'
may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. 50
144. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
145. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980).
146. Id. Canon 1.
147. Id. Canon 9.
148. Id. EC-9-2.
149. Id.EC-9-1.
150. Id. EC 9-2; see also id. EC 8-6 (assuming that a lawyer's "intemperate statements tend
to lessen public confidence in our legal system"). Scholars have reiterated this supposed connection between the public's trust in lawyers and confidence in the legal system more generally.
See, e.g., John A. Humbach, The NationalAssociation of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty,
"Lawyer Honesty" andPublicTrust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REv. 93,93 (1999) (assuming
that, "[ijf the public cannot trust the lawyers who are entrusted with the legal system, there is a
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The persistent theme of image-preservation emerged throughout the
Code but, as was also the case with the Canons, most clearly in the
numerous structural provisions relating to advertising and lawyer selfpromotion. Although more permissive than the Canons, the Model Code
still placed substantial limits on lawyer self-promotion and relied heavily
on public trust for those limitations. For example, the original version of
Model Code EC 2-9 said: "Public confidence in our legal system would be
impaired by . . . advertisements of legal services" because "it would
inevitably produce unrealistic expectations in particular cases and bring
about distrust of the law and lawyers."'51
In addition to emphasizing image, the Model Code reflected a concern
for lawyers' economic well-being. 5 2 Not only did the Code's advertising
rules reflect anticompetitive instincts,' but so did the Code's restriction
on fee sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers (i.e., its prohibition
against multidisciplinary practice arrangements).' 54 Such restrictions,
which still exist in substantially similar form under the presentlyproblem that casts a shadow on the integrity of the very concept of rule of law") (emphasis
omitted).
151. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-9 (1977) (emphasis added). This
presumed relationship between advertising and public confidence in lawyers has been undermined
by numerous studies. See, e.g., William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer
Advertising: PublicImages andthe Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325,
326 (1996); Rotunda, supra note 13, at 729-32. One study of the issue is particularly compelling.
Concerned for the profession's image, Chief Justice Warren Burger set up a Commission to study
the effects of lawyer advertising on public opinion. ROTUNDA, supra note 115, at 34. Despite
Burger's concerns, the Commission found that "it is principally lawyers-not clients-who are
concerned about the style and message of certain legal advertising." COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 124, at 276. Since then, yet another ABA study reached a similar
conclusion. COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 120, at 3. In particular, the Commission, which
described its work as "the most comprehensive ever undertaken on this subject" of lawyer
advertising, id. at i, found that the relationship between advertising and public image is
"questionable." Id. at 3. Indeed, "[w]hile the legal profession strongly believes that advertising
contributes to the decline of the profession's image, the public rarely mentions advertising as a
factor." Id.; see also RHODE, supra note 16, at 148 (arguing that "many restrictions on lawyers'
commercial speech seem designed less to protect the public than to protect the profession's public
image").
152. See Morgan, supra note 19, at 704 (asserting that the Model Code was "consistently selfserving"). Professor Morgan makes the trenchant observation that lawyer self-interest is not an
unworthy pursuit; a legal education, after all, is costly to obtain, and we need to ensure that people
have an incentive to pursue a career in law. Id. at 706. Morgan goes on to conclude, however, that
the Model Code simply places too much emphasis on lawyer self-interest at the expense of other
more important concerns, such as client interests and the pursuit ofjustice. Id; see infra Part IV.B.
153. Morgan, supra note 19, at 712 (reaching the same conclusion about the Code's
advertising provisions).
154. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBLITY DR 3-102, -103 (1982). Similar prohibitions
appeared as late additions to the Canons, see CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canons 33-34 (1908), but
the prohibitions became more developed under the Model Code.
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governing Model Rules of Professional Conduct,' benefited attorneys by
ensuring that non-lawyers did not obtain controlling interests in law
practices. The fear was that large companies, such as accounting firms,
would gobble up existing law firms, put them under non-lawyer control,
and offer attorneys reduced incomes and less autonomy over their
practices.' 56 Even worse, retail stores might open legal services
departments and compete with small firms and solo practitioners.' Many
attorneys quite simply feared that MDPs would threaten their businesses,
and the Model Code's MDP-prohibition reflected this concern. Of course,
not all lawyers opposed MDPs and many members of the profession
voiced concerns about MDPs not described here; the position-shared by
many ethicists-is that the restriction on MDPs (a structural rule) resulted
at least in part from the protectionism and image-consciousness that has
persistently pervaded the legal profession.'
Another manifestation of protectionism appeared in the Code's rules
regarding the unauthorized practice of law.5 9 In spite of the enormous
range of ethical issues that arise in practice, the Code dedicated an entire
Canon (out of only nine in the entire Code) to the dangers and problems
with non-lawyers performing legal work. 60 Although this issue is
discussed in greater depth in Part VI, it is worth noting that scholars have
offered considerable evidence that the bar's analysis of non-lawyer
practice dramatically overestimates the harm and underestimates the
benefits of allowing non-lawyers to perform routine legal tasks.' 6 ' For
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2002).
156. See, e.g., COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, A.B.A., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF

DELEGATES 2 (July 2000) (identifying and responding to this concern).
157. In fact, this is one of the very concerns that caused the drafters of the Model Rules (i.e,.
the Kutak Commission) to reject a version of Rule 5.4 that would have permitted MDPs. Charles
W. Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice ofLaw: Paths Taken and Not Taken, 52
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 970 (2002) (discussing the Kutak Commission's rejection of MDPs
after it was noted that Sears might become a competitor for lawyers).
158. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 121, at 974.
159. See Morgan, supra note 19, at 712 (concluding that "the prohibition of unauthorized
practice is primarily for the benefit of lawyers"). The profession has a long history of excluding
non-lawyers in an attempt to protect the profession's economic interests. See, e.g., Gerard Gawalt,
Sources ofAnti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts,1740-1840, 14 AM. J.LEGAL HIST. 283,304-05
(1970) (describing how Massachusetts lawyers in the 18th and early 19th centuries required
extensive training to practice law).
160. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 3 (1980).
161. Morgan, supra note 19, at 707-12. The bar recently conducted a study that favored
loosening unauthorized practice laws. COMM'N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, A.B.A., NONLAWYER
ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1995). Tellingly,
however, the ABA's House of Delegates has largely ignored the most ambitious proposals
contained in the report. Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FOREHAM L. REV.
747, 765 (2001). In fact, the ABA recently approved a resolution calling for strengthened
unauthorized practice laws. Deborah Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70
FORDHAM L. REv. 1543, 1553 (2002); see also Deborah Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective:
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instance, Professor Rhode has observed that as much as eighty percent of
the legal needs of the poor currently go unmet, 62 and that non-lawyers
could help this under-served segment of the population obtain legal
services they would not otherwise receive.6 3 Despite the benefits of
loosening unauthorized practice laws and the lack of evidence regarding
the harms that non-lawyers would allegedly cause in the context of routine
matters,'" the Model Code urged states to adopt rigorous restrictions on
non-lawyer practice.' 65 One could certainly identify many rationales for
these restrictions, including consumer protection, but a prominent concern
was, quite simply, featherbedding.' 66 As one noted scholar has concluded,
laws against the unauthorized practice of law represent "[p]erhaps the
clearest example of167a Code standard which operates primarily for the
benefit of lawyers."'
c. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Even the now-governing Model Rules of Professional Conduct retain
an emphasis on professional image and protectionism.168 With respect to
image, the chairman for the committee that generated the new rules made
the concern about perception explicit. Upon adoption of the Model Rules
in 1983, the chairman declared that "' [t]he legal profession has taken a
step which should improve its image. '169 Professor Ted Schneyer
examined the political context in which the ABA created the Model Rules
and found that the ABA drafted them, at least in part, to "shor[e] up among
Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701, 702
(1996). So even though the report evidences some willingness to support measures that are
inconsistent with the bar's economic interests, those efforts have failed.
162. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 16, at 7.
163. See id.

164.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 4 cmt. c (2000) (noting

"that actual experience in several states with extensive nonlawyer provision of traditional legal
services indicates no significant risk of harm to consumers of such services").

165.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 3. The restrictions on unauthorized

practice of law also appeared as a late addition to the Canons. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHics Canon
47 (1908).
166. It is worth noting that the courts under the Model Code tended to apply an "appearance
of impropriety" standard to conflicts of interest cases. Interestingly, the Model Rules dropped the
appearance of impropriety standard, and the courts now infrequently refer to appearances in
conflicts cases. This development, especially combined with the courts' continued use of image in
the advertising context confirms one of this Article's central observations: that the profession has
adopted image-related justifications for structural rules but has become less inclined to do so with
respect to representation regulations.
167. Morgan, supra note 19, at 707.
168. Schneyer, supra note 126, at 725-26 (identifying self-protection as a major theme that
"animates American lawyers today" and a theme that affected the Kutak Commission during its
drafting of the Model Rules).
169. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 6.
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lawyers and regulators the ABA's image as lawgiver for the practice of
law."'17 Schneyer also noted that the Rules were a response to "a felt need
to shore up the profession's public image in the wake of the Watergate
scandal, in which many lawyers were implicated.''
The reliance on public perception and self-interest is apparent in a
number of structural areas. For the reasons explained in the context of the
Code, the Model Rules' continuing restrictions on MDPs, including the
rejection of a recent initiative that would have permitted them, 72 reflects
the profession's economic interests. 173 Moreover, the Model Rules (until
quite recently) 74 did not discourage states from adopting strict regulations
against interstate practice. As a result, many states have erected elaborate
procedures to prevent incursions from out-of-state lawyers. 171 State bars
have identified a number of reasons for strict rules against
multijurisdictional practice, though the most important is likely
protectionism. 76 As Professor Thomas Morgan noted more than twentyfive years ago, "[r]ules setting geographical limits on areas in which
lawyers may practice are . . . used to protect lawyers . . . against
competition from their legally trained brethren."' 177 It is not simply
happenstance that many of the states with the strictest rules, such as Rhode
Island and New Jersey, also happen to border states that have large
numbers of potential competitors (Massachusetts and New York,
respectively). 78 Although the ABA recently adopted a proposal to
170. Schneyer, supra note 126, at 688 (asserting that the ABA drafted the Rules in order to
enhance its own image and the image of the profession).
171. Id.

172.

COMM'N ON MULTDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra

note 1.

173. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 121, at 974.
174. See infra Part VI.B.2.
175. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1,
5-6 (Cal. 1998); In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62,64 (R.I. 2001) (denying fees to a Massachusetts lawyer
who represented a client before a Rhode Island administrative body even though the body granted
the lawyer a pro hac vice admission; the Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoned that only it could
grant such admissions and that the administrative body's action to the contrary was invalid).
176. Morgan, supra note 19, at 725-26.
177. Id. at 725; see also Gerard J. Clark, Two Faces ofMultjurisdictional Practice,29 N. KY.
L. REV. 251, 254 (2002) (reviewing the recent MJP case law and concluding that "protection of the
innocent and unsuspecting.., public seems very distant to the courts' deliberations"); Charles W.
Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession:InterjurisdictionalUnauthorizedPracticeBy
TransactionalLawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 665, 679 (1995) (arguing that the "real motivation [for
many MJP regulations]... has to do with cutting down on the economic threat posed for in-state
lawyers... by competition with out-of-state lawyers").
178. See, e.g., In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62 (R.I. 2001) (exemplifying Rhode Island's strict
approach to MJP); COMM. ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, N.J. STATE BAR Assoc.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjpcomm njsba.html (setting out the New Jersey bar's opposition to proposed MJP revisions and
offering more conservative alternatives than the ABA's MIP Commission); see also Wolfram, supra
note 177, at 681 (making a similar observation about New Jersey). But see New Jersey Supreme Court
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liberalize multijurisdictional practice (MJP) rules,' 79 the proposal is
without force unless adopted by individual states. Moreover, the ABA's
MJP Commission earlier rejected an even more liberal proposal that would
have created a kind of national drivers' license model for attorney
admissions' 8 ' Even though at least one member of the MJP Commission
thought the more liberal version (dubbed the "Common Sense Proposal")
was "'a wonderful idea,"' the Commission rejected the proposal at least
in part because it could not be "'sold"' to the ABA's House of
Delegates. 1

The Model Rules do evidence a more liberal approach to advertising
and soliciting than the Code, but recent developments suggest that a return
to more restrictive regulations may be under way. Around the time the
Kutak Commission drafted the Model Rules, the profession began moving
toward more permissive advertising rules as a result of an increasing
public concern for consumer protection, government attention to
anticompetitive behavior by lawyers, 8 2 a greater awareness of the unequal
distribution of legal services,' 83 and the United States Supreme Court's
strengthening of First Amendment speech rights for attorneys in the
seminal case of Bates v. State Bar ofArizona 4 In the last several years,
however, the profession has once again promulgated more restrictive
limitations on lawyer advertising and solicitation by relying on the wellworn justification of lawyer image. This return to more restrictive
regulations based on a concern for public perception is on vivid display in
the Supreme Court's recent decision in FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc. 85
'
In Went For It, the Court examined the constitutionality of a Florida
statute enacted in 1990 that prohibited lawyers from contacting accident
victims or their families (even by mail) within thirty days of an

Proposesto Allow Limited MultijurisdictionalPractice,71 U.S.L.W. 2436, 2436 (2003) (noting
a recent proposal to liberalize MJP in New Jersey, though the proposal does not go quite as far as
the recent ABA amendments).
179. See COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 3.
180. See Interim Recommendations Need Changes, Speakers Urge at MJP Commission
Hearing,70 U.S.L.W. 2499, 2499 (2002).
181. Id.
182. COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 120, at 33 (observing that "[rlesearchers and
commentators have postulated.., that the ban on advertising was one of a number of methods used
by the organized bar early in the 20th Century to limit entry into the profession and restrict trade").
183. Id. at 35-37.
184. 433 U.S. 350, 385 (1977); see also Fla. Barv. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,622 (1995)
(noting that "[clonstitutional protection for attorney advertising.., is of recent vintage").
185. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). It is worth noting that the Court's retrenchment may reflect a
change in personnel as much as a change in philosophy. Both Justices Thomas and Breyer, who had
not been on the Court at the time of the related predecessor case, Shapero v. Kentucky BarAss 'n,
486 U.S. 466 (1988),joined the dissenters from the Shapero case to create the majority in Went For
It. Rotunda, supra note 13, at 720 n.67.
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accident.'86 Although strikingly similar to the regulation struck down in the
Court's 1988 decision in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n'"' (the only
significant difference being the thirty-day waiting period as opposed to an
outright ban), the Court upheld the Florida statute. 8' The Court concluded
that, with regard to such forms of solicitation, the "Bar has [a] substantial
interest both in protecting injured Floridians from invasive conduct by
lawyers and in preventing the erosion ofconfidence in the profession that
such repeatedinvasionshave engendered."' 89 In support of its conclusion,
the Court relied heavily on evidence submitted by The Florida Bar that
purported to show that advertising adversely affects the public's
impression of lawyers.' 90 The Court's reliance on this evidence is difficult
to justify in light of the Court's previous skepticism about public image
serving as a basis for regulating lawyer advertising' 9' and the lack of
scientific evidence demonstrating a correlation between advertising and
public opinion.1 92
Ultimately, an examination of the history of structural regulations
reveals that the bar has often used these rules to promote lawyers' image
and economic interests. Of course, while not all structural rules further
these goals, 193 a wide range of the profession's structural regulations have,
in fact, advanced those objectives.
3. Legal Education
Although not part of the Model Rules, legal education requirements are
also structural in that they define who can practice law and what people
need to know in order to do so. They also reflect the twin goals of imageenhancement and protectionism. Robert Stevens, in his classic account of
the history of American legal education, wrote that "the concept of
providing part of legal training through an institution known as the law
school had become associated with the parallel aspect of
institutionalization-the urge to raise standards and to make the bar more
competent and more exclusive."' 94 Jerold Auerbach has explained that
186. Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 620.
187. 486 U.S. 466, 470-71 (1988) (holding that the Model Rules' prohibition on targeted
mailings was unconstitutional).
188. Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at635.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id.at 626-29.
191. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-72, 379 (1977) (expressing skepticism
that the State's desire to maintain attorneys' dignity is an interest substantial enough to justify the
abridgment of their First Amendment rights).
192. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
193. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS, THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 22 (2002-2003 ed.) (arguing that although "some of the rules may be self-serving,

others are not").
194. STEVENS, supra note 104, at 24.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/2

32

Perlman: Toward a Unified Theory of Professoinal Regulation
TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

enhanced educational requirements also furthered protectionist impulses;
that is, they helped to keep immigrants and minorities out of the legal
profession.195 In 1922, for example, Yale Law School's Board of
Admissions expressed concern about "'the Jewish problem."" 96 The
school's Dean even "suggested to the state bar in 1923 that students with
foreign parents should be required to remain longer in college than nativeborn Americans before being admitted to law school."' 97 That same Dean
also urged the Yale faculty not to use "grades as the basis of limiting
enrollment to the law school, because such a development would admit
students of'foreign' rather than 'old American' parentage, and Yale would
become a school with an 'inferior student body ethically and socially."" 98
Similar expressions of discriminatory intent litter the materials from this
period.' 99
Although the discriminatory motives have largely disappeared, selfprotection and image-polishing still play a role in legal education,
especially in the context of professional responsibility. In fact, the recently
enhanced commitment to teaching legal ethics appears to have arisen, at
least in part, out of a concern for the bar's image.200 In particular, many
law schools began requiring for-credit legal ethics instruction in the mid1970s in what appeared to be a response to the disastrous public relations
effects of Watergate, a scandal in which many lawyers were implicated. 0 '
More recently, nearly all states have required students to pass the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) 202 as a
prerequisite to becoming members ofthe bar.20 3 This development also has
some of its origins in the face-saving efforts that followed Watergate.20 4
195. AUERBACH, supra note 134, at 107-08; see also ABEL, supra note 36, at 41-73.
196. STEVENS, supra note 104, at 101.
197. Id.; see also AUERBACH, supra note 134, at 107-08.
198. STEVENS, supra note 104, at 101.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Legal Education:ProfessionalInterests and Public Values,
34 IND. L. REV. 23, 38-39 (2000).
201. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Legacy ofWatergatefor LegalEthics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 673, 673 (2000); Paul T. Hayden, PuttingEthics to the (NationalStandardized)Test: Tracing
the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1332-33 (2003). The rise in for-credit,
mandatory ethics courses was also related to the ABA's 1973 rule that required all law schools to
offer some sort of legal ethics instruction. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
supra note 30, Standard 302. That rule, however, did not require for-credit courses, so the rise in
such courses appears strongly related to Watergate, even ifthe new rule itself was not related to that
event. Hayden, supra at 1332-33.
202. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION, availableat http://www.ncbex.org/tests.htm. (last visited Aug. 8,
2002).
203. Hayden, supra note 201, at 1299 (noting that passage ofthe MPRE is now required in all
but three states).
204. Id. at 1301 (arguing that Watergate's role in the creation of the MPRE "cannot be
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The profession's concern for public image, therefore, has affected legal
ethics instruction as well as other structural features of professional
regulation.
In the end, one finds structural rules in a variety of contexts and
covering different substantive issues, but two themes appear consistently:
an attempt to ensure confidence in the legal profession and to protect the
bar's economic well-being. The next question is whether these premises
for structural regulations deserve the privileged place that they have
received. The answer, as suggested below and as noted by many
commentators, is no.
IV.

THE INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING STRUCTURAL OBJECTIVES

This Part contends that the bar's two most commonly sought structural
objectives-the advancement of lawyers' public image and the promotion
of their economic interests-ultimately prove quite unattractive as
justifications for professional rulemaking and are consequently in need of
revision. Certainly, quite a few commentators have recognized the
undesirability of these objectives, so this Part necessarily draws heavily on
the work of previous scholars.0 5 That said, this Part makes explicit two
important points. First, it addresses the presumed link between image and
systemic confidence and suggests that the link is not as strong as the
profession has assumed. Second, it suggests that the focus on image and
self-protection has not affected all professional regulations equally; rather,
the focus has occurred primarily in the context of systemic issues.
A. Image as a Justification
The improvement of the profession's image might appear, at first
glance, to be a compelling objective given the abundance of surveys
documenting the public's distaste for lawyers. Many studies, including one
finding that a minuscule five percent of parents would choose law as the
best profession for their children,2" 6 have found that the public holds

dismissed as irrelevant," but also arguing that the MPRE's emergence had other causes).
205. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 36; RHODE, supra note 16; Morgan, supra note 19, at 707.
206. Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at I (reviewing
the results of aNational Law Journal/West Publishing Company poll). But see Walter S. Morsberg,
A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in Offices, Fieldsand Factories, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 15, 1977, at Al (citing a poll that found parents viewing law as one of the top three careers
that they would want their children to pursue). At least one explanation for this contrasting finding
is that the latter poll was conducted more than twenty-five years ago, at a time when many
commentators believe the public had a better impression of attorneys. However, coming shortly
after Watergate and the well-publicized role of lawyers in that scandal, this explanation is dubious.
The differences quite likely reflect distinctions in methodology rather than an evolution of
sentiment.
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lawyers in particularly low esteem." 7 Many scholars and practitioners
believe that the legitimacy of the American justice system relies in no
small part on the public's image of lawyers and conclude that the
profession's rule-makers must therefore take these surveys into account.208
This Part, however, draws on a substantial body of literature to
demonstrate that there may be little correlation between lawyers' image
and public confidence in the justice system and that the profession should
consequently place less emphasis on public opinion when crafting rules of
structural significance.20 9
1. The Empirical Problem: The Unproven Link Between
Lawyer Image and Institutional Confidence
The public's impression of lawyers does not affect society's confidence
in legal institutions to the extent that the profession has assumed. Recent
studies demonstrate that the public's interaction with, and respect for,
lawyers has some effect on the level of trust for the justice system as a
whole but that this relationship is relatively weak in comparison with other
207. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 108, at 3-4 (citing numerous studies that document the
low regard in which the American public holds the legal profession); Gary A. Hengstler, Vox
Populi: The Public PerceptionofLawyers: ABA Poll,A.B.A. J. Sept. 1993, at 60,62 (summarizing
the findings of a nationwide telephone survey commissioned by the ABA which found that only
forty percent of the public had a favorable view of lawyers); Chris Klein, Poll:Lawyers Not Liked,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A6; Randall Samborn, Poll: Image of Lawyers Around Country
Grows Worse, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 1; Humphrey Taylor, Lawyers and Law Firms Plumb the
Depths of Public Opinion,THE HARRIS POLL, Aug. 11, 1997 (finding that only nineteen percent of
respondents believe that the legal profession enjoys "very great prestige"); see also Hornsby &
Schimmel, supra note 151, at 325 n.2 (citing numerous public opinion polls involving lawyers).
208. See, e.g., N. Lee Cooper& Stephen F. Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image and
the Scope ofProfessionalism,26 CUMB. L. REV. 923, 923 (1996) (adopting former ABA President
N. Lee Cooper's belief that "confidence in the American justice system begins with the public
perception of lawyers"); Steven A. Delchin & Sean P. Costello, Show Me Your Wares: The Use of
Sexually ProvocativeAds to Attract Clients, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 64, 108 & n.229 (1999) (citing
numerous articles in support of the same claim); R. William Ide 111, What the ABA Plans to Do,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 65, 65 (claiming that "[w]ithout public confidence in lawyers and the
profession, the entire justice system is compromised"); Gregory Zimmer, Note, Suing a Current
Client: Responsibility and Respectabilityin the Conduct ofthe Legal Profession, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 371, 388 (1998) (positing that "indifference to public perception of the legal profession
[causes] a considerable diminution of the respect afforded to ... the justice system in general").
See also supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY: HOW THE ETHICS WARS HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS,
AND SOCIETY 5 (1997); Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1459-60 (1999). Specifically, commentators have criticized lawyers'
concern for self-image, arguing that the profession needs to increase its attention to substance rather
than to perception. These critics of so-called "appearance ethics" have contended that a positive
professional image does little to instill confidence in the legal system and that perceptions should
therefore not serve as a proper basis for reform.
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factors. A representative survey-a 1999 study by the American Bar
Association-supports this conclusion.21
Before delving into the ABA survey's findings, it is worth noting the
lack of nuance that typically accompanies discussions of public trust in the
legal profession. One problem is that the literature has failed to
differentiate between the public's trust in the profession in general and a
particular individual's trust in her own lawyer to perform necessary legal
services. The problem is that one can have trust in one's own lawyer but
believe that the profession as a whole is undeserving of confidence, or vice
versa. Unfortunately, surveys rarely make this distinction, but it is critical
to the presumed objective of strengthening confidence in the legal system
generally. In particular, the remedies for curing a lack of confidence in
one's own lawyer could be quite different from the reforms necessary to
change the public's perceptions of the profession. For example, rules
regarding advertising may affect lay attitudes about the bar, but they will
probably not impact an individual's trust in her own attorney. Conversely,
a change in conflicts rules is unlikely to alter lay attitudes about the bar,
but it could affect an individual's relationship with her lawyer. In the end,
studies assessing public attitudes have not done a particularly good job of
identifying what forms of public trust they are measuring. 1 They also do
not explain the relative importance of each form of trust: that is, should we
have greater concern for what clients think of their own lawyers or for
what the public thinks about the profession as a whole?
Even if we assume that discussions of public trust relate to perceptions
of the legal profession more generally, a second problem with many
discussions is that they tend to assume that lawyer popularity is an
appropriate measure of confidence. In reality, one could identify at least
two forms of public opinion: lawyer popularity and trust in attorneys. The
first concern relates to how popular lawyers are; the second relates to
whether the public trusts attorneys to carry out their responsibilities to the
courts and to the justice system. People may trust lawyers to carry out their
public responsibilities but at the same time not like them. Conversely, the
public may like lawyers but believe they do not fulfill their obligations to
the courts and to the justice system. Accordingly, even if there were some
correlation between public confidence in the profession and trust in the
system, surveys do not reveal much information about which type of
public opinion lawyers should address. The studies that exist, however, do
not offer much support for the idea that trust in the legal profession
(generically defined) has a significant impact on trust in the justice system.
210. See M/A/R/C RESEARCH, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 50, 56, 73 (1999).
211. See RHODE, supra note 16, at 4 (arguing that "what the public dislikes about the legal
profession is hard to disentangle from what it dislikes about the law, the legal system, and the
lawyer's role within that system").
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One telling and representative study is the ABA's 1999 survey, Public
UnderstandingandPerceptionsof the US. Justice System.2 2 The survey
polled a representative sample of 1,000 Americans and assessed their
attitudes about the United States system of justice and the various
institutions within it. 213 A key objective of the study was to identify the
factors that influence people's attitudes about legal institutions and to
determine which of those factors affect public confidence in the justice
system as a whole.21 4
At the outset, one important finding is worth highlighting: public
confidence in the justice system does not require trust in the legal
profession. Consider that eighty percent of respondents thought the
Americanjustice system is "the best in the world" 2 5 and that thirty percent
were extremely or very confident in the U.S. justice system in general. 2 6
In contrast, only fourteen percent expressed strong confidence in the legal
profession.217 There are many possible explanations for these results, but
one conclusion is unavoidable: people can have trust in the justice system
as a whole without having significant confidence in lawyers. Of course,
this conclusion does not preclude a correlation between impressions of the
legal profession and systemic trust. It may very well be the case that if the
public had even lower trust in lawyers, the additional lack of trust would
have resulted in lower confidence in the justice system. Conversely, the
public might have had even more confidence in the justice system if
people had a better impression of lawyers. Nonetheless, strong confidence
in the justice system does not require strong confidence in attorneys.
This conclusion is also supported by an examination of peoples'
attitudes sorted by their knowledge of legal institutions. The survey asked
respondents numerous questions about the justice system to gauge their
knowledge and found that people who were well-informed about the legal
system had the most confidence in the justice system, with thirty-nine
percent having a great deal of trust. 21 At the same time, these respondents
also had the least trust in the legal profession, with only twelve percent
having strong confidence in the bar.21 9 Conversely, respondents with the
lowest levels of knowledge had more trust in lawyers and lower
212. M/A/RIC RESEARCH, supranote 210, at 1.
213. Id. at l, 3.

214. Id.at l.
215. Id. at 58.
216. Id. at 50; see also LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOC., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS:
CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 6 (2002) (finding that thirty-nine percent of the public is

extremely or very confident in the American justice system but only nineteen percent are extremely
or very confident in the legal profession).
217. M/A/R/C RESEARCH, supra note 210, at 7.
218. Id. at 54.
219. Id.
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confidence in thejustice system as a whole.22 ° In other words, many people
with less confidence in the profession have greater confidence in the
system and vice versa, offering particularly telling evidence of the limited
correlation between the two forms of trust.22'
Table 1:222
Respondents
Extremely or Very
Confident in the U.S.
Justice System
Most
Knowledgeable
Respondents (Top
25% of Sample)
Least
Knowledgeable
Respondents
(Bottom 25% of
Sample)

Respondents
Extremely or Very
Confident in the
Legal Profession

39%

12%

28%

19%

The next question, therefore, is whether there actually is any correlation
between people's trust in lawyers and their confidence in the justice
system. Unfortunately, the ABA study only hints at the answer to this
question. The hints suggest that there does exist some limited relationship,
but it is not the kind of correlation that the profession seems to presume.223
The survey identified thirteen factors, including one entitled "Lawyer
220. Id.
221. See id. It is not hard to imagine why people with high confidence in lawyers might have
less confidence in the system. One possible explanation is that people with the lowest levels of trust
in social institutions nonetheless acknowledge that lawyers often have battled to change those
institutions. See ROTUNDA, supra note 115, at 37 (noting that blacks tend to "view lawyers more
favorably than do whites" because "lawyers have been instrumental in securing civil liberties for
racial minorities"). But see Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of
Survey Evidence, I I LAW & SOC'Y REV. 427,436-37 (1977) (citing studies that show that the poor
have lower opinions of lawyers than the rest of the popdlation). In the same vein, political liberals
tend to trust the judicial system less (and thus frequently oppose the death penalty), yet are less
critical of the legal profession. Conversely, conservatives tend to have strong confidence in the
system but distrust lawyers. Former Vice President Dan Quayle, for example, was a vocal critic of
the legal profession, see, e.g., Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil
Justice, 71 DENy. U. L. REV. 77, 77 (1993), but trusted the legal system to make life and death
decisions with regard to the death penalty.
222. M/A/R/C RESEARCH, supra note 210, at 54.
at 82-83.
223. See id.
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Issues" that summarized respondents' attitudes about the legal system.224
A regression analysis then revealed which of the thirteen factors had the
greatest influence on respondents' beliefs about legal institutions in
general.225 The survey found that the system's treatment of minority
groups, the system's concern for technicalities, and courts' responsiveness
to victims and requests for information all had a greater role in affecting
institutional perceptions than did issues relating to lawyers.226
The survey did find that respondents' beliefs about lawyer issues
correlated to some degree with systemic perceptions. 227 That finding,
however, does not support the conclusion that we should be concerned
about the profession's image. Rather, the public's concern about lawyer
issues turned on matters quite apart from lawyer popularity and focused on
the profession's structural inadequacies. 228 For example, the public's views
on the reasonableness of the cost of lawyers' services, the number of
lawyers as a whole, and lawyers' concern for their own self-interest all
affected systemic trust to some small degree. 229 That finding simply does
not support a strong link between the public's perception of lawyers and
systemic trust, and other recent studies imply a similar conclusion.230
2. Alternative Justifications for the Focus on Public Confidence
One might argue that, even if there is little or no correlation between
the public's perception of lawyers and the public's confidence in the
justice system, there may be other reasons to care about the profession's
image. For example, it might be argued that we need to attract intelligent,
competent people to the practice of law, and if the profession has a
negative image, such people will not become lawyers. The problem with
this argument is that the profession's image has been low for most of the
nation's history and was, as explained earlier, even worse than it is today.
The profession, though, has never had trouble attracting talented people to
the field. In fact, even during more hostile times, intelligent
224. Id.at 77.
225. Id. at 80.
226. Id.at 82.
227. See id. at 94.
228. See id.
at 77.
229. See id.
at 77, 82.
230. In the same year as the ABA study, a number of organizations (including the ABA)
sponsored a conference in an attempt to identify issues that contribute to confidence in the justice
system. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY (1999). After compiling a list ofopossible issues that could affect confidence,
conference participants, who included both lawyers and non-lawyers, attempted to identify the key
drivers of systemic trust. Interestingly, lawyers and non-lawyers roughly agreed on the key factors
affecting the public's confidence in the nation's judicial system, and the behavior of lawyers was
simply not a prominent concern. Id. at 12-13.
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people-including many of the Constitution's authors-were lawyers.23 '
There is thus little evidence that a poor (or even poorer) public image
would affect the quality of the bar in such a significant way as to raise
concerns.
One might argue that one difference today is that there are more career
options for intelligent people than there were centuries or even decades
ago. The greater availability of alternative careers might make law
relatively less attractive than it was in the past. While this possibility
surely exists, the evidence is to the contrary. Law school applications have
not dropped to any significant degree in recent years despite an apparent
downturn in the public's impression of the profession. Rather, applications
appear tied more closely to changes in the economy than to changes in the
public's impression of the bar.2 32
Another possible reason to focus on image is that poor public
perception might lead lay people to call for changes to the legal profession
that would, in the long run, adversely affect the public itself.233 For
example, if the public sufficiently dislikes lawyers, government might
revoke the profession's monopoly and adopt reforms that would hurt the
public in the end. 234 Again, there is scant evidence to support this concern.
Democratic institutions regularly craft regulations that are considerably
more complex and arcane than the professional responsibility of lawyers,
so there is little reason to believe that such institutions would do a worse
job protecting the public's long term interests than lawyers do when
regulating themselves. 23" As this Article has attempted to make clear, selfregulation creates significant opportunities for problematic rules; it is
difficult to believe that democratic institutions would do worse.2 36
That said, the profession's rule-makers should not ignore public
opinion; there are plenty of circumstances where the profession should pay
attention to what the public thinks. For example, lawyers deserved
231. FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 84 (noting that a "competent, professional bar, dominated
by brilliant and successful lawyers... existed in all major communities by 1750 despite opposition
and adversity").
232. See Terry Carter, The Economics ofAdmissions: Law Schools Get a Boost in Admissions
when the Economy Goes South, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, June 28, 2002, at 5.
233. See RHODE, supranote 16, at 16 (noting the profession's beliefthat it needs independence
from government control in order to serve the common good).
234. Id. at 145; cf Tom Tyler, PublicMistrust of the Law: A PoliticalPerspective, 66 U. CIN.
L. REv. 847, 863 (1998) (identifying a similar argument in the context of the court system).
235. See Nancy J. Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered,1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.773,788
(arguing that lawyers "should immediately reject.., the.., dangerous (if only implied) suggestion
that any incursions on the tradition of self-regulation are inevitably inimical to the public interest").
236. One compelling middle ground position is to get the public more involved in the bar's
self-regulating functions. Rather than having lawyers create their own rules, lawyers could obtain
meaningful participation in the rule-making process from lay people. RHODE, supranote 16, at 14546.
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criticism for their role in Watergate and in many scandals since then,237
including (perhaps) the Enron debacle.238 The profession should certainly
consider these criticisms when crafting professional regulations.239 The
public's opinion, however, should not be the touchstone that it has often
been. As one scholar has found, "[t]here is considerable evidence to
suggest that public dissatisfaction with the courts is based upon a variety
of misconceptions held by the public about the operation of the courts and
of the legal system., 240 Although that conclusion relates to the public
perception of the courts, there is no reason to think that the public has any
better understanding of lawyers when it evaluates the profession. As
Professor Ronald Rotunda has argued: "[L]awyers should not expect to
win popular'ity contests.... Lawyers will never be widely loved as long
as they are really doing their jobs. 2 41 Professor Rotunda continued:
When people are asked what they dislike most about lawyers,
the top fault [according to surveys] is that [they] are "too
interested in money," (3 1%); second, lawyers file "too many
unnecessary lawsuits," (27%); and third, lawyers "manipulate
the legal system without regard for right and wrong." (26%).
Now, what do people like about lawyers? For the general
public, the most positive aspect of lawyers is: "Putting
clients' interests first," (46%); second, lawyers protect
people's rights (25%). . . . We receive accolades and
denunciations for doing the same thing.242
In other words, just because the public has a criticism or does not like
lawyers does not necessarily mean that the profession should do something
237. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding that
lawyers aided security law violations); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's
Duty of Candorand the Bar's Temptations of Evasion andApology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243
(1998) (describing the role of large firm lawyers in helping Charles Keating evade government
scrutiny in relation to the savings and loan scandals).
238. See, e.g., James V. Grimaldi, Jamail Goes On the Offensive In Defense of Vinson &
Elkins, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, at El (describing the role of lawyers in the Enron scandal).
239. If the profession ignores these types of criticism, it risks losing control over some of its
rulemaking authority. For example, the ABA House of Delegates recently voted down an
amendment to the duty of confidentiality which would have allowed a lawyer to disclose
confidential information when a client engages in a crime or fraud that would likely "result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property interests of another." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Amend. 2002). The SEC is now seeking to circumvent
the ABA's rejection of the amendment by imposing new obligations on lawyers who represent
publicly traded companies. Grimaldi, supra note 238 (arguing that the ABA's unwillingness to
change Model Rule 1.6 to cover financial crimes led to the SEC's current attempt to accomplish
the same effect).
240. Tyler, supra note 234, at 854.
241. ROTUNDA, supra note 193, at 36.
242. Id. at 36-37; see also RHODE, supra note 16, at 6-7 (making a similar observation).
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about it. The profession, in the last analysis, has simply paid too much
attention to its image in the creation of structural rules.
B. The Problem With Self-Interest
One might assume that self-interest is an ugly justification for
professional regulations, but there is at least one legitimate reason for the
profession's protectionism. Professor Thomas Morgan has observed that
"[t]he high level of specialized professional skill with its extended training
period is costly to develop. Members of the Bar seek both to have a
' For these
satisfying career and to make a good living practicing law."243
reasons, Professor Morgan correctly concludes that self-interest deserves
at least some small role in the rule-making process.244
That said, Professor Morgan rightly notes that the profession has placed
too much emphasis on its interests.245 Professor Deborah Rhode, another
prominent ethicist who has identified the profession's self-interested
behavior in much of her writing, reaches a similar conclusion. She writes
that "[r]egulation of the legal profession has been designed primarily by
and for the profession, and too often protects its concerns at the public's
expense. , 246 Indeed, Professors Rhode and Morgan recognize what should
almost be axiomatic: the bar should not unduly emphasize its own interests
when creating the profession's structural rules. Such an emphasis fails to
give sufficient attention to other, more important concerns, such as the
needs of the justice system as a whole. Of course, this conclusion does not
preclude some emphasis on the bar's self-interests; it simply suggests that
those interests have received too much attention.
The subsequent parts of this Article propose shifting the bar's focus
away from protectionism and image consciousness and toward more
compelling justifications for structural rules. This proposal sounds fine in
theory, but it would likely find considerable resistance in practice.
Although this Article does not offer much in the way of political strategies
to avoid such resistance, Professor Rhode has suggested one important
reform. She has argued that the bar should have greater lay involvement
in its regulatory processes. 47 That involvement would help mitigate the
extent of the bar's self-interested rule-making, while still keeping
professional regulation in the hands of lawyers.
Putting aside the political problems with reducing the bar's focus on
self-interest, it is nonetheless important to recognize that the focus exists
243. Morgan, supra note 19, at 706.
244. Id.; see also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a state has an interest in protecting the economic wellbeing of its own lawyers).
245. Morgan, supra note 19, at 706.
246. RHODE, supra note 16, at 208.
247. Id. at 146-47, 222.
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and is excessive. One might argue that the bar has relied on other
important factors in its regulatory efforts, including consumer protection,
economic efficiency, and the like. This is no doubt true. The point, though,
is that image and self-interest are simply two of the most prominent
sources of rule-making guidance, and the bar has given them an
unjustifiably large role, even when mixed with more benign objectives.
The question then becomes: is there a way to create a more appealing
framework for conceptualizing structural rules?
V. TOWARD A THEORY OF STRUCTURAL RULES

One can imagine two different approaches to creating a theory of
structural rules. First, one could look to the well-developed models that
ethicists have applied in the context of representational rules.
Alternatively, one could develop a theory that is unique to the structural
context. This Part contends that conventional models of lawyer behavior,
such as the dominant view and its critics, ultimately offer the most
compelling framework because those models would unify our vision of
professional regulations. That is, they would provide us with one body of
theory that would explain both representational and structural regulations.
One might object that this unification of theory ignores key differences
between representational and structural rules. Unlike representational
rules, which must address the realities that attorneys face in the context of
representing individual clients, structural rules address larger objectives,
such as the needs of the justice system as a whole. Or one might argue that
representational rules need to rest on a vision of the attorney-client
relationship, whereas structural rules rest on a broader set of ideals about
the lawyer's role in society as a whole. Theories of systemic reform,
according to this view, need to rely on a different set of concerns than do
theories about representational rules.
In reality, both representational and structural rules ultimately aim-or
at least should aim-to accomplish the same objective: creating the best
possible system of justice. Discussions about attorney values, the
importance of the attorney-client relationship, and the role of lawyers in
society all boil down to a fundamental difference of opinion over the ideal
justice system. For example, dominant view proponents believe that the
best system is one in which parties engage in an adversarial search for the
truth, with each lawyer advocating her client's objectives to the fullest
extent the law allows.24 Dominant view critics, in contrast, believe the
best system emphasizes other values, such as morality or justice in
particular cases."'

248. See supra Part III.A.
249. See id.
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Structural rules are no different; their content affects the shape of the
justice system, so any attempt to craft effective structural regulations must
necessarily consider what the ideal system should look like. For example,
unauthorized practice laws dictate who can practice law and, accordingly,
affect the contours of the justice system. To determine the ideal substance
of such laws, one must necessarily make reference to some conception of
the ideal system, and conventional theories provide a ready-made
framework.
Another reason to unify ethics theory is the interrelatedness of
professional regulations. For instance, many commentators have argued
that MDPs would have a significant impact on how lawyers behave,
including affecting lawyers' zealousness, their willingness to abide by
their duty of confidentiality, and their obedience to conflict of interest
rules.25 ° The structural regulation, therefore, would interact in important
ways with representational rules. To ensure that structural rules of this sort
do not conflict with the purposes underlying representational regulations,
it makes sense to refer to the purposes of representational regulations when
creating the structural rules themselves. That is, consistency dictates using
the same rationales for structural rules that we use for representational
rules."'
One might respond that, even if one assumes that both types of
professional rules should rely on a common theory, the conventional
models offer an unduly limited universe from which to choose such a
theory. For example, economic efficiency252 and consumer protection both
offer equally compelling objectives for professional rules, but they are not
often part of the standard theoretical discussions. This objection lies not
so much in the need for a unified theory as in the content of such a theory.
Taking a stand on the most attractive model, however, is beyond the scope
of this Article, and readers are urged to consult the wonderful literature
that already exists on the issue.253 This Article makes a simpler point, but
one no less important: the debates about ethics theory have more dramatic
implications than commentators have tended to acknowledge. Namely,
ethicists should apply the theories to rules that govern the very structure
of the legal profession rather than limiting their application to
representational rules.
250. See infra Part VI.C.
251. Interestingly, even if one were to cling to the public image justification for structural
rules, it is worth noting that ethics theories would still have relevance in that context. See, e.g.,
PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE As THEY Do xiii (1998) (suggesting that the public's
poor impression of lawyers turns at least in part on the lawyer's adherence to the dominant view
of ethics).
252. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 16, at 144 (discussing market theories of professional
regulation); Fischel, supra note 121, at 969-74.
253. For more detail, see supra Part III.A.
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That said, it is worth noting that the often-mentioned goal of consumer
protection is not a particularly attractive unifying rationale for ethics
regulations. As the discussions of MDP, MJP, and non-lawyer practice
make clear, consumer protection is frequently used to mask protectionist
and image-related objectives. Another problem is that consumer protection
is already a component of existing legal ethics theories. Consider again the
Florida Bar's thirty day restriction on mail solicitation. 254 When assessing
the rule, the dominant view would consider the rule's impact on zealous
advocacy. If the rule adversely affected consumers (i.e., clients and
potential clients), it would also be inconsistent with the dominant view. In
this way, the dominant view necessarily incorporates consumer protection
into the analysis. Similarly, critics of the dominant view express a concern
for consumer protection. If a lawyer engages in behavior that hurts
consumers and does nothing to forward the interests of justice, dominant
view critics would favor banning the conduct. Consumer protection,
therefore, should not serve as a unifying theory of professional
responsibility because it is already a component of the more elaborate
understandings of the lawyer's role embodied in the dominant view and its
critics.
In contrast, proponents of law and economics do not encounter the
same issues, and they have successfully applied a single theory-economic
analysis-to both representational and structural rules. 255 Although these
scholars have not expressly acknowledged their advocacy of a unified
theory of professional responsibility, their work is an implied admission
that such a theory is not only possible, but desirable. The hope is that these
scholars will more explicitly recognize the unified nature of their approach
and that advocates of competing views will begin to extend their
frameworks in similar ways. In short, the application of law and
economics to professional responsibility is helpful, not necessarily because
of the merits of the analysis but because of the possibilities it implies.
Finally, one might make a somewhat different objection to the use of
conventional ethics theory in the structural context: traditional models are
not intended to offer prescriptions about the specifics of professional rules,
not even at the representational level. Indeed, many ethicists try either to
explain how lawyers should exercise their judgment in the absence of
binding law or argue for more discretionary approaches to existing rules.
Professor Simon, for example, has advanced a view of ethics that gives
lawyers more freedom to decide how to represent their clients, and he
254. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Legal RegulationofLawyers 'Conflicts ofInterest, 60
FORDHAM L. REv. 579, 580-82 (1992) (applying an economic analysis to conflict of interest rules);
Fischel, supra note 12 1, at 969-70 (applying law and economics to a structural issue); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An EconomicAnalysis ofConflict ofInterest Regulation, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 965, 966-68 (1997),
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admittedly offers few prescriptions about the content of particular rules.2 56
Rather, Professor Simon describes the institutions that would support his
discretionary view of attorney behavior." 7 Accordingly, one might argue
that conventional models like Simon's are specifically intended not to
define the content of professional rules and would thus make poor models
for structural matters.
What this potential objection overlooks is that, even if an ethics theory
(such as Simon's) does not offer specific prescriptions for the content of
representational rules, it necessarily incorporates a vision of the ideal
justice system. For the reasons explained earlier, any such vision
inherently contains prescriptions for structural rules. So even though
Simon does not spell out the ideal content of representational regulations,
his commitment to promoting justice in particular cases has consequences
for the profession's structure. Part VI offers some detail about what those
consequences might be, but for now it suffices to note that conventional
models-even those pitched at a more abstract level-are important
sources for a unified theory of professional responsibility.
Conventional ethics theories, of course, will not always yield clear
answers on issues of systemic reform, nor should we necessarily import
such theories wholesale. Rather, my contention is that prevailing models
would help frame systemic issues more crisply and in a way that is
consistent with theories of individual lawyer behavior. Moreover, even if
we must modify conventional ethics theory to inform discussions of
professional structure, a recognition of the relationship between the two
forms of professional regulation would yield a more unified and coherent
lawyering model.
VI. THE UNEXPLORED IMPLICATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL
THEORIES: SOME EXAMPLES

Conventional ethics models have a great deal to offer in the context of
structural regulations, though theorists rarely suggest that possibility. This
Part reviews three key issues of structural concern-client solicitation,
unauthorized practice laws, and MDPs-and explains how conventional
ethics theories can offer new insights. Moreover, this Part suggests that,
although the dominant view and its critics offer conflicting prescriptions
in the context of representational regulations, they often have surprisingly
similar and progressive implications for structural reform.

SIMON, supra note 5, at 195.
257. Id. at 195-215.

256.
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A. Client SolicitationRules
Client solicitation rules offer an excellent example of how conventional
ethics theories can advance the profession's dialogue on questions of
structural significance.258 In addition, the theories offer a surprisingly
unified argument in favor of more liberal solicitation rules.
1. The Dominant View
The dominant view offers a strong case for more permissive client
solicitation rules. Recall that the dominant view posits that lawyers should
employ all possible lawful means to accomplish a client's ends and that a
key value underlying the dominant view is the promotion of a client's
autonomy. 9 The very essence of autonomy is trust in an individual's
ability to choose for herself, to choose from a variety of alternatives and
to do so in her own best interests. The client-not the lawyer, not society,
not anyone-is the best judge of what is best for the client, or so dominant
view adherents maintain.
An emphasis on client autonomy could cut two ways in the context of
solicitation rules. On the one hand, a lawyer is not supposed to interfere
with a client's decisionmaking process and should merely follow the
client's instructions.26° It follows that direct solicitations are undesirable
because they influence individual choices, a consequence at odds with the
value of autonomy that lies at the heart of the dominant view.26 '
Accordingly, strict regulations-like the thirty-day prohibition on postaccident solicitation letters upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
FloridaBar v. Went for It 262-would have some appeal.
A different and ultimately more persuasive claim is that the goal of
client autonomy does not preclude a lawyer from giving a client advice.
Rather, autonomy requires that the lawyer comply with the client's
informed decision after the lawyer has presented a client with various

258. The focus here is on solicitations instead of traditional advertising because unlike other
forms of advertising, the United States Supreme Court has upheld solicitation restrictions as
constitutional. As a result, solicitation questions turn more squarely on policy considerations. See
generally Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
259. See supra Part II.A.
260. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 167 (presenting this conception of the dominant view). But see
Andrew M. Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics Theory, 31 SETON HALL L. REV.
829, 847 n.91 (2001) (suggesting that Luban's description of the dominant view on questions of
moral dialogue does not match the views of the dominant view's own proponcnts).
261. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978) (making a similar
argument in upholding a ban on in-person solicitations). Butsee In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439
(1978) (striking down as unconstitutional a ban on in-person solicitations when the lawyer solicits
a client for a pro bono matter).
262. 515 U.S. at 620.
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options and perhaps suggested the best course of action.263 This description
paints a richer and more attractive portrait of autonomy in that the client
has more information and is consequently more able to make a decision
that is in her best interests.264 Of course, the lawyer could manipulate the
information given to a client in such a way as to make the lawyer's
preferences more appealing, 265 but for many clients-particularly
knowledgeable individuals or corporations-some information about a
choice (even if manipulated in some way by the lawyer) is arguably better
than no information at all.266
One might argue that the types of prospective clients who lawyers will
personally solicit are not well-informed individuals or corporate entities;
rather, soliciting lawyers will target unsophisticated consumers. As a
result, the potential for undue lawyer influence is large. Even if this is true,
however, the existence of other soliciting lawyers offers a market-based
corrective to any lawyer misconduct. If all lawyers are free to solicit
clients, the chances are slim that one lawyer's misrepresentation will go
uncorrected by another lawyer. The existence of other soliciting lawyers
arguably makes it less likely that a lawyer will distort information than
under the current system. Presently, a prospective client could seek out one
or a small number of prospective counsel, leaving fewer opportunities for
correction by competing lawyers.
Another potential objection is that unsophisticated clients will not
necessarily choose the best lawyer; they will choose the lawyer who does
the best job of soliciting them. As a result, in-person solicitation would
produce inferior representation, a result at odds with the dominant view.
What this objection assumes, however, is that unsophisticated clients
would choose a more competent attorney in the absence of solicitations.
There is little empirical evidence to support this assumption, and
intuitively, it would seem that one would be just as likely to retain a poor
lawyer by using a phone book or the Internet. From this perspective, even
the most aggressive forms of solicitation-such as in-person contact
within thirty days of an accident-fail to undermine and might even
enhance an individual's autonomy.267
263. This process is sometimes referred to as moral consultation or moral dialogue and is not
inconsistent with the dominant view. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 60-62; Stephen L.
Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 192-94
(1999); Perlman, supra note 260, at 847-48.
264. But see Simon, supra note 51, at 165-76 (critiquing the standard theories of moral
dialogue and suggesting that it is difficult for a lawyer to identify a client's autonomous choices

without referencing the lawyer's own sense of what is in the client's best interests); Morgan, supra
note 19, at 719.
265. See Pepper, supra note 263, at 192-93.
266. Cf id. at 194-95 (suggesting that corporate and sophisticated individual clients will not
be adversely affected by moral dialogue).
267. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 329-31 (making a similar point from the
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One might respond that this approach still allows disturbing behavior,
such as a lawyer knocking on the door of an accident victim's family the
day after a fatal automobile collision. This conduct could result in the
family bringing a lawsuit they would not otherwise have brought, hiring
a lawyer that they would not have chosen, or entering into an unfavorable
fee agreement with the lawyer. Another fear is that a client would have
difficulty documenting what a lawyer said during an in-person meeting
and would thus have trouble proving that a lawyer had made a fraudulent
claim or stretched the truth about what she was capable of doing.268 On top
of it all, one might find that the solicitation is just plain offensive because
it intrudes on the privacy of grieving individuals.
These fears overstate the costs and understate the benefits of in-person
solicitations. As an initial matter, a lawyer who misrepresents herself or
her fees is subject to discipline, so although it is more difficult to prove
what went on behind closed doors, it is not hard to imagine that lawyers
who engage in deceptive practices would not get away with it for long.269
As for concerns about a client feeling pressured into hiring a lawyer,
statutes exist in many states that permit a client to terminate a contract for
legal services within a certain period of time after the client signs the
contract."' Although a client may not discover this right on her own, other
visiting lawyers would certainly do so, making the availability of in-person
solicitations that much more important. The doomsday scenario also
overlooks the substantial benefits that an individual might obtain because
of the rapid hiring of an attorney. In particular, the visiting lawyer could
make the victim's family aware of legal rights and give the family the
opportunity to hire a lawyer who could immediately set to work on
" ' Also underestimated is an
accumulating valuable, fresh evidence.27
individual's capacity to tell a soliciting lawyer to take a hike (to put it
mildly)." There is also the possibility that competition will encourage
perspective of the dominant view).
268. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466-67 (1978).
269. Indeed, the lawyer in Ohralik abused his position in a number of ways when seeking
clients through in-person solicitations, such as surreptitiously tape-recording conversations with
clients, using the tape recording to obtain fees after the client terminated the relationship, and using
confidential information gleaned from one client in order to encourage another client to hire him.
Id. at 449-52. His shenanigans did not go unreported, nor likely would similar misbehavior by other
lawyers.
270. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 643 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Again,
Ohralik is an example. The client in that case fired the lawyer shortly after hiring him. Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 451-52. Of course, in Ohralik the lawyer sued the client for fees, suggesting that the inperson solicitation did the client much more harm than good. See id. at 452. Ohralik's consequent
disbarment, id. at 453-54, however, should demonstrate why such lawyer behavior would likely be
rare.
27 1. Cf Went ForIt,
515 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH,
supra note 5, at 329-3 1.
272. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 643 (suggesting that "clients will not hire lawyers who offend
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lawyers to offer lower prices, whether in the form of lower billable rates
or more client-favorable contingency arrangements.273 Finally, and perhaps
most critically, the lawyer might protect the family from defense lawyers
who might try to negotiate a low-ball settlement with the family before
they hire their own attorney.2 74 In any event, the visit might be offensive
and may upset a family already in grief, but it also may advance, not
undermine, the key value of autonomy underlying the dominant view.275
In the same way, in-person solicitations are consistent with the
dominant view's prescription of zealous advocacy. By waiting thirty days
to contact an individual to inform her of her legal rights, the lawyer is
arguably failing to work in the potential client's best interests. As
explained above, witness recollections diminish and evidence may
disappear or become stale during a thirty day period; moreover, defense
counsel might visit the prospective client and influence the person to sign
away important rights. 76 Put simply, delays in obtaining counsel can
adversely affect the representation that a person receives and are counter
to a client's interests.277 The key value of autonomy thus suggests a more
permissive approach to solicitation rules, and the core prescription of
zealous advocacy supports it as well.
Even if one thinks that the most aggressive form of in-person
solicitation described above undermines autonomy or should otherwise be
prohibited, the reasons for that conclusion are much less applicable to
regulations, such as the one in Went ForIt, that prohibit mailings. In that
case, even fewer concerns about interfering with autonomy are present,
and the concerns about invading a family's privacy are substantially
reduced.2 7' The argument here is not necessarily that the Supreme Court
decided the Went ForIt case incorrectly as a matter of 9onstitutional law,
them") (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
273. See, e.g., COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 120, at 2-3 (noting the correlation
between advertising and lower fees and observing that "advertising is a major factor in the delivery
of legal services, especially to the poor"); Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court
Decisions Upholding ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH L. REV. 1, 166-69 (1984); John R. Schroeter
et al., Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation,
J. INDUS. ECON., Sept. 1987, at 49.
274. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 13, at 721.
275. Perhaps state bars can adopt the same kind of "don't call" lists that states now use in the
context of telemarketers. See, e.g., Michael McCarthy & Jayne O'Donnell, FTC Could Get
Telemarketers to Stop Calling, USA TODAY, June 5, 2002, at BI (describing a telemarketer
proposal at the federal level). Specifically, if people do not wish to be contacted by an attorney,
they could simply put their names on a "don't call" list for attorneys created by the state bars.
Lawyers who do not comply could be disciplined.
276. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 329-31 (identifying and elaborating on
an actual example of this scenario, Gunn v. Washek, 176 A.2d 635 (1961)).
277. Morgan, supra note 19, at 721.
278. See generally Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635-645 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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although there is ample evidence that it did.279 Rather, the claim is that
Florida and other states28° that have adopted similar measures should
rescind them as inconsistent with the premises of the dominant view.2"'
2. Critics of the Dominant View
Despite differing prescriptions for representational rules, dominant
view critics would likely generate similar prescriptions for solicitation
provisions. Assume, for example, that one adopts Professor Simon's
critique of the dominant view and believes that justice-rather than
zealous advocacy-should serve as a lawyer's professional touchstone. A
prerequisite ofjustice is that people are actually aware of their legal rights
and have access to the justice system.28 2 In-person solicitations and
23
targeted mailings of the type at issue in Went ForIt advance these goals.
First, both forms of solicitation make people aware of their legal rights.
Moreover, solicitations-and advertising more generally--can affect the
affordability of and access to legal services by producing lower prices

279. There are a number of reasons to question the Court's decision. First, there is
considerable empirical evidence to suggest that the studies relied on in Went For It were flawed.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 151. Moreover, even if one believes in the validity of the
evidence the Court cites, the study at issue found that only 27% of recipients of the direct
solicitation letters had a reduced image of the profession. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 627. How the
other 73% of recipients changed their view of the profession (if at all) we are not told. It suffices
to say, however, that the vast majority of recipients of such mailings did not have a lower view of
the profession. ROTUNDA, supra note 115, at 691. In addition, it is at least arguable that lawyer
communications to prospective clients go to the very core of First Amendment activity and deserve
more than the protections afforded commercial speech. Indeed, communications to individuals
offering to help them seek legal redress through the government (i.e., the courts) appear to be what
the First Amendment is designed to protect. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 635-37 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Finally, the Court fails to explain why the Florida restrictions should apply only to
plaintiffs' lawyers. Is it not equally offensive for a defense lawyer to get a victim or a victim's
family to sign a hastily considered settlement agreement in the days immediately following an
accident? One would think so, but the Florida law does not prohibit that behavior. Rotunda, supra
note 13, at 721-22. One is left to believe that the law reflects an attack on a particular kind of
message from lawyers (i.e., you should sue), rather than an attempt to regulate the conduct of the
messenger, making the rule an unconstitutional form of viewpoint discrimination. See Gross, supra
note 209, at 1459-60.
280. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., supra note 37, at 1033 n.9; John Phillips, Six Years After
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: The ContinualErosion of First Amendment Rights, 14 GEO J.
LEGAL ETHiCs 197, 203-09 (2000) (describing the enactment of similar rules in several other
states).
281. One recent case distinguished Went For It and struck down a statute relating to the
solicitation of criminal defendants. See Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150, 1150 (4th Cir. 1997).
282. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretionin Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1092-93
(1988).
283. Cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (finding client solicitation restrictions in the
context of pro bono work to be unconstitutional).
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through increased competition."8 4 Specifically, the more that attorneys
have access to potential clients, the more competitive the market for legal
services should become and the more access people should have. With
some studies suggesting that as much as eighty percent of the poor's legal
needs go unmet,2" 5 greater access and lower prices would forward the
interests of justice. So to the extent that client solicitation advances these
interests, it would be consistent with at least one critique of the dominant
view.
One could make other arguments about the proper scope of solicitation
rules using Professor Simon's framework and similar critiques. The goal
in this Article, however, is not necessarily to offer the definitive
description of what those critiques mean for solicitation rules, but merely
to suggest that ethicists should spend more time exploring those
implications. This Part is simply a first step toward such a discussion,
offering one possible way of bridging the gap between treatments of
representational and structural regulations. Significantly, these preliminary
assessments produce the notable conclusion that seemingly conflicting
theories of legal ethics may offer similar conclusions in a key area of
structural concern.
B. UnauthorizedPracticeLaws
As is the case with lawyer self-promotion, conventional ethics theories
have not said enough about the rules and statutes that govern the
unauthorized practice of law. An examination of what they could say
suggests that conventional theories offer support for a more permissive
approach to determining who should be allowed to practice law in a
particular state.
Initially, it is worth noting that statutes and state ethics rules regarding
unauthorized practice (UPLs) regulate two different forms of conduct.
First, UPLs address what most people think of when they hear the term
"unauthorized practice of law"; namely, they prohibit non-lawyers from
engaging in law practice. This type of UPL defines what constitutes the
practice of law and then prohibits non-lawyers from engaging in those
activities. Second, UPLs regulate what lawyers can do in a particular state
when they are not licensed to practice in that jurisdiction, such as when a
Massachusetts lawyer travels to New York to conduct business on behalf
of a client. This issue, commonly referred to as multijurisdictional practice
(MJP), has become increasingly controversial in recent years because of
284. See supra note 273 and accompanying text; see also ABEL, supra note 36, at 121-22.
285.

THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INC., NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE

POOR, in A.B.A. CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE PUBLIC, Two NATIONWIDE SURVEYS:

1989 PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE POOR & PUBLIC GENERALLY 37 (1989) (finding that 80% of the
poor's legal needs currently go unmet); see also Deborah L. Rhode,Access to Justice,69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1785, 1785 n.1 (2001) (citing numerous studies supporting this claim).
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two developments. First, the California Supreme Court in Birbrower,
Montalbano,Condon & Frank,P.C. v. SuperiorCourt,286 invalidated most
of a one million dollar fee owed to New York lawyers because the lawyers
had earned the money while negotiating a settlement in California and
were not admitted to the California bar.287 The ruling caught many lawyers
by surprise, as the Birbrower attorneys never appeared in a California
courtroom and had merely sought a settlement for their client through the
use of arbitration.288 Even more recently and partly in response to the first
development, the ABA adopted a proposed revision to the Model Rules,
which would (if adopted by states) loosen restrictions on MJP.28 9 The
contention below is that conventional theories contribute to the debate
regarding both types of UPLs.
1. Non-Lawyer Practice
By applying the dominant view to the issue of non-lawyer practice, we
once again find that the concepts of client autonomy and free choice have
distinct implications. The concepts imply that a client should have control
over whom she selects to perform her legal services, especially since that
choice will have a substantial impact on the quality of the client's
representation. From this perspective, the dominant view appears to
support a client's freedom to select a non-lawyer representative.
One might respond that the importance of legal services actually
suggests the need for strict controls over non-lawyer practice. As
explained in the advertising context, autonomy is valuable only to the
extent that an individual has received information from which to make a
choice. By employing a non-lawyer, a client might not receive the best
available information and would consequently make poor decisions and
receive inadequate representation. The client, according to this view,
would not be sufficiently informed to satisfy the demands of autonomy
and, even if the client received adequate information, the non-lawyer
would conduct the work the client requested less effectively than would a
lawyer. To avoid these outcomes, the profession must ensure that only
lawyers provide legal services to individuals.
One problem with this reasoning is that it rests on a faulty premise. It
assumes that, if we loosen UPLs, people who currently employ lawyers
will become customers of non-lawyers. In reality, a substantial number of
people cannot afford to hire lawyers and, if faced with the choice between
286. 949 P.2d I (Cal. 1998).
287. Id. at 2-4. California subsequently amended state law to permit lawyers to practice in
cases similar to Birbrower, but the amendment was only temporary. See, e.g., Joaquin Vieira,
Reciprocal Licensing Signed Into Law, METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE, Aug. 29, 2000, at 5.
288. Id.
289. COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that the
Birbrower case was one of the causes of the current concern for MJP issues).
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representing themselves and getting an attorney (the choice they face with
strict UPLs), these people will represent themselves or, in a proceeding
they want to initiate, fail to initiate it.29 The choice, therefore, is not
between a lawyer and a non-lawyer; it is between a non-lawyer assistant
and no assistance at all.29 ' The only remaining question is whether nonlawyers who specialize in a given area (e.g., divorce) can do a better job
than people representing themselves pro se. The answer is that scholars
have produced ample evidence that lay people would benefit from nonlawyer assistance.292 Accordingly, for a great number of people access to
a non-lawyer will improve-not diminish-the quality of legal assistance
they receive. Thus, the choice of a non-lawyer is an appropriate expression
of autonomy that the profession should support.
One might respond that, even if the poor might benefit from the
loosening of UPLs, non-lawyers would under-price lawyers and cause
people who could afford lawyers to hire non-lawyers. The result is the
usual parade of horribles: inadequate information, inferior representation,
and decreased respect for the legal system and the administration of
justice. First, this reasoning is counter to the idea of client autonomy that
lies at the heart of the dominant view. If people really think that nonlawyers can provide a better value, why not let them try? As long as
people know that an individual is not a lawyer, the individual is assuming
that risk and can be informed of that risk when incurring it. Second, there
is actually little evidence to suggest that non-lawyers would do an inferior
job when representing individuals on routine legal matters (e.g., divorce).
In fact, there is considerable evidence that non-lawyers can be at least as
effective as lawyers when handling such issues.293 And even if some nonlawyers are truly incompetent or constitute significant drains on judicial
290. One might argue that, if no lawyer finds a case valuable enough to litigate, society should
not expend resources to handle the matter because the matter is too insignificant. But this reasoning
assumes that a lawyer's profit incentive is the proper metric by which to determine whether a claim
should be heard. Indeed, there may be other reasons a legal matter is worth pursuing, even if it does
not offer immediate renumerative benefits for a lawyer. For example, some types of civil rights
cases might not produce significant legal fees but are worth pursuing because of their legal
importance. Moreover, the drafting of documents (such as wills) might help save people and the
court system money in the long run, but a low-income individual might not be able to afford the
fees of a lawyer to draft such a document.

291. Cf

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 4 cmt. c (2000)

(observing "that many persons can ill afford... the typically higher cost of lawyer services").
292. Actually, the evidence suggests not only that non-lawyer professionals could do a better
job than lay persons, but that they can even do as good a job as lawyers on simple matters. See
Rhode, supra note 285, at 1806. Indeed, the benefits of nonlawyer practice have been recognized
for years by scholars and practitioners, but lawyers have done little to weaken their own monopoly.
Id.; see also ROTUNDA, supra note 115, at 573 (noting the pervasiveness of nonlawyer work in noncourtroom settings in Europe).
293. See sources cited supra note 292; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS

§ 4 cmt. c (2000).
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resources (e.g., because of frivolous filings), wronged clients could bring
negligence actions against such practitioners (who could be required to
carry insurance), or the courts could simply bar these people from
engaging in non-lawyer practice. The bottom line is that the benefits of
non-lawyer practice in routine areas outweigh the costs of such services
and ultimately further clients' interests in zealous representation.
True believers in zealous advocacy also should go one step further.
Rather than simply loosening UPLs, they should also argue for more
government funding for entities like the Legal Services Corporation to
ensure that people also receive proper representation for more complicated
legal matters.294 Put another way, autonomy and zealous advocacy require
not only greater access to legal advice through non-lawyers, but also
greater funding for civil legal services organizations as well.295 Along the
same lines, a dominant view proponent also should be an advocate of
mandatory pro bono to the extent that legal services programs are unable
to provide sufficient representation on more complicated matters.
Dominant view critics would reach similar conclusions but through
different reasoning. For example, Professor Simon focuses on achieving
justice in individual cases, a position that necessarily entails access to legal
services. The United States Supreme Court recognized this reality in the
criminal context when it decided the seminal case of Gideon v.
Wainwright.2 96 The Court found that "reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him."2'97 The Court's conclusion seems
no less true in the civil context, where parties also need adequate legal
advice in order to ensure just resolutions.298 Simon's position, in other
words, implies that individuals should receive legal advice for all matters
that involve the justice system, not just criminal proceedings.
Ideally, people would receive civil legal advice from attorneys. The
reality, though, is that the Court is unlikely to extend Gideon to civil
matters, and government's willingness to expand the availability of civil
294. Cf Pepper, supra note 5, at 617 (observing that "[individual] autonomy is often
dependent upon access to the law"). Unfortunately, Pepper does not explore the deeper structural
significance of his statement in relation to unauthorized practice of law or government funding for
legal services, even though his position has implications for these areas.
295. Interestingly, Professor Pepper explicitly declines to make this point, arguing that unequal
access is simply the by-product of a market-based system. Id. at 619-20. His emphasis on
autonomy, however, is hard to square with his rejection of calls for greater access. Cf David Luban,
The Lysistration Prerogative:A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637,
643-44 (finding faults with Pepper's reluctance to address inequalities in access to legal services).
296. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
297. Id.at 344.
298. Cf LUBAN, supra note 5, at 261-62 (making a similar argument regarding the potential
scope of Gideon).
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legal counsel is questionable given the cost.299 Moreover, with few
exceptions (Florida being one), states have consistently resisted attempts
to impose mandatory pro bono requirements.3"0 As a result, the increased
availability of non-lawyers who specialize in routine legal matters would
offer the greatest likelihood that justice would occur in individual cases.
The availability of non-lawyers would lower the cost of legal services,
enabling more people to access legal advice, and thus presumably increase
the likelihood that justice is achieved in a greater number of legal
matters.30 '
Luban, like Simon, not only would-but does-support loosening
unauthorized practice laws.3 °2 The limitation of Luban's analysis is that he
does not reach his conclusion by relying on his theory of lawyer behavior;
rather, he examines what the United States government requires in order
to maintain its legitimacy and concludes that expanded access is necessary
to that end.30 3 Luban need not have been so reluctant to draw on his theory
of lawyer behavior. If one assumes (as Luban does) that lawyers have an
obligation to pursue morally worthy ends using morally acceptable
means, 3 4 then that premise would seem no less true when applied to the
legal profession as a whole. That is, the legal profession has moral
obligations just as the individual members of that profession.
Luban does argue for mandatory pro bono, °5 but he does not explore
what would happen if(as seems likely) mandatory pro bono does not solve
the problem of inadequate legal services for the poor. In that case, it would
seem that lawyers also have an obligation to ensure that people have
access to legal advice through other means, namely through loosening the
rules on non-lawyer professionals. Luban's framework, therefore, is
consistent with calls for loosening the profession's monopolistic grip on
routine legal services, though Luban does not explore this line of argument
to the extent that he could.
The preceding discussion is in no way intended to replace or even
summarize the very rich and powerful literature that already exists on
299. The sparse funds allocated to legal services organizations through the Legal Services
Corporation and other funding sources supply only a small fraction of the legal needs of the poor.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
300. See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Needfor Regulation of Lawyers'
Negotiations With UnrepresentedPoor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 156 (1997).

301. But see Richard L. Abel, Socializingthe Legal Profession:Can RedistributingLawyers'
Services Achieve Social Justice?, I LAW & POL'Y Q. 5, 40-42 (1979) (questioning whether access
to legal services will affect the poor to the extent that many believe); Marc Galanter, Why the
'Haves'Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAW & SOc'Y. REV. 95,
149-51 (1974) (same).
302. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 269-73.
303. Id. at 252-56.
304. Id. at xxii.

305. Id. at 282-88.
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unauthorized practice.306 The discussion is instead intended to suggest that
the literature has too often overlooked the importance of conventional
theories when addressing the issue of non-lawyer practice. In addition, the
analysis implies that ethics theories offer a more uniform recommendation
about the unauthorized practice of law than they do in the context of
representational rules.3 °7
2. Multijurisdictional Practice
The ABA recently approved a revision to the Model Rules that would
(if adopted by the states) make it easier for lawyers to practice in
jurisdictions where they are not admitted to the bar.30 8 In the process of
drafting the rule revision, the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice
rejected an even more radical idea dubbed the "Common Sense
Proposal."3 9 Rather than simply making it easier to engage in
multijurisdictional practice, the Common Sense Proposal would have
created a national licensing system similar to what states use in the context
of drivers' licenses.310 Once admitted in one jurisdiction, a lawyer would
have been able to practice anywhere else in the United States with only
limited exceptions.311 The following discussion contends that the Common
Sense Proposal was more consistent with the profession's pre-existing
theories of lawyering and that the idea should have received more
enthusiastic support from the bar.
From the perspective of the dominant view and, in particular, its
reliance on client autonomy, the Common Sense Proposal has considerable
appeal. Autonomy requires that clients be given choices, and as explained
306. See, e.g., COMM'NONNONLAWYERPRACTICE, supra note 161; Rhode, supra note 285;
Rhode, supra note 122, at 209; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
ConstitutionalandEmpiricalAnalysis of UnauthorizedPracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REV.
1(1981).
307. Interestingly, even if one believes that we should care greatly about the profession's
public image, there is some evidence that more permissive UPLs would enhance the public's
perception, or at least avoid some troubling images that arise when states crack down on nonlawyer practice. See, e.g., Rhode, supranote 306, at 219 (citing the negative publicity arising out
of Florida's campaign against alay person's divorce service); LEOJ. SHAPIRo&AssOC., supra note
216, at 32 (identifying the education of the public in handling common legal problems as the best
way to enhance the profession's image). Moreover, the ABA-M/A/R/C Research Study discussed
earlier identifies access as the most significant method for improving confidence in the justice
system. M/A/R/C RESEARCH, supra note 210, at 82. In short, even if one believes that systemic
trust should serve as the touchstone for structural rules, that premise also appears to support more
permissive unauthorized practice laws.
308. See Stephen Gillers, It's an MJP World: Model Rules Revisions Open the Doorfor
Lawyers to Work Outside Their Home Jurisdictions,A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 51.
309. See Interim Recommendations Need Changes, Speakers Urge at MJP Commission

Hearing,supra note 180.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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earlier, there are few choices in the legal context more fundamental than
one's selection of a legal representative. Accordingly, if a Rhode Island
citizen wants to hire a Massachusetts lawyer to draft a will (a scenario
permissible under the Common Sense Proposal but probably not under the
proposal actually adopted by the ABA), why should the client be
prohibited from doing so? The most common answer is that the
Massachusetts lawyer is less likely to be familiar with the relevant law in
Rhode Island than a Rhode Island lawyer, so strict MJP provisions are
necessary as a matter of consumer protection.312
The consumer protection argument has a number of important
weaknesses. First, there is no evidence that a Massachusetts lawyer,
particularly one who specializes in wills, would have any difficulty
uncovering the nuances of Rhode Island law as it relates to writing such
a document. The skills of legal research are the same in every state, so
although it might take a Massachusetts lawyer a bit longer, the work
product should be no worse than what a similarly-experienced Rhode
Island lawyer could produce. As the MJP Commission itself pointed out:
"Often, the most significant qualification to render assistance in a legal
matter is not knowledge of any given state's law, but knowledge of federal
or international law or familiarity with a particulartype of business or
'
personaltransactionor legalproceeding."313
One might respond that the client should not have to pay for the
Massachusetts lawyer's self-education on Rhode Island law. If the lawyer
does not charge by the hour, however, the consideration would be
irrelevant. Moreover, even if the Massachusetts lawyer bills by the hour,
the hourly rate would presumably reflect the lawyer's knowledge of the
law just as it does for in-state attorneys. When young lawyers pass the bar,
their billable rate is lower than the rate of more experienced attorneys; one
would expect experienced lawyers to adjust their rates in the same way
when they have to undertake an unusual amount of self-education. Of
course, it might turn out that a lawyer misjudges her knowledge, does not
adjust her rate in advance, and leaves the client paying more than if the
client had hired an in-state practitioner.314 But such fears arise no less
frequently for in-state lawyers who try to tackle new practice areas but
discover that they overestimated their knowledge. Thus, out-of-state
lawyers present problems in this regard that are no different from the
problems that states already have with their own lawyers.
A second reason to be skeptical of the consumer protection argument
is that there is no reason to believe that a Massachusetts lawyer will have
any more difficulty understanding the relevant law than a recent law
school graduate who just passed the Rhode Island bar exam. Why should
312. See, e.g., COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
313. Id.at 3 (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 15.
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the latter lawyer, who would likely have no practical experience and little
substantive knowledge, be allowed to service the Rhode Islander, while a
Massachusetts lawyer with substantially more experience would not? This
question is particularly pointed, given that the recently-admitted Rhode
Island lawyer would not have had to obtain substantial knowledge about
Rhode Island law in order to pass the bar exam. For the most part, states
administer bar examinations that draw heavily (and in some states
exclusively) on nationally accepted legal concepts,315 so it would appear
that a lawyer's membership in a particular bar says little about the
lawyer's knowledge of local law.
One might argue that Rhode Island would want control over the out-ofstate lawyer for disciplinary purposes,3 16 but there is precedent for
allowing states to discipline out-of-state lawyers who engage in practice
within the state.3 17 Moreover, one could easily adopt a reciprocal system
of disciplinary enforcement, such as the ABA's recent amendment of Rule
22 of the Model Rules of Lawyers Disciplinary Enforcement.31 The new
rule encourages states to discipline their own lawyers whenever those
lawyers are disciplined for conduct that occurred in anotherjurisdiction.1 9
Another objection to national practice is that it will produce a "'race to
the bottom,"' allowing lawyers to gain admission to the bar in states with
easier admissions requirements and then to move to states with stricter
standards. 320 As an initial matter, bar admission standards are only a rough
measure of a lawyer's knowledge and ability. Is it possible to say that
someone who barely passes the bar examination in Minnesota (a
statistically easier bar exam) will be a worse lawyer than someone who
barely passes the California bar (a traditionally difficult exam)? Not really.
But even if.we are concerned about such a problem, one could simply
identify a bar exam test result that would qualify for national licensing.
That way, a person with a barely passing score in a jurisdiction with easy
bar admission requirements would not become nationally licensed and
would receive only local licensing.
315. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Concept ofNationalLaw and the Rule ofRecognition, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1229, 1239 (2002); Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer's Next Hurdle: The
State-BasedBar Examination System, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 235, 245-46 (2000).
316. COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 9.
317. See, e.g., In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2001); ABA Delegates Approve
Proposalsto Allow Some MultijurisdictionalPracticeby Lawyers, 71 U.S.L.W. 2106,2107 (2002)
[hereinafterABA DelegatesApprove Proposals](describing the ABA's revision of Model Rule 8.5,
which would allow a state to discipline a lawyer who acts within its borders even if the lawyer is
not admitted to practice there).
318. ABA Delegates Approve Proposals,supra note 317, at 2107; see also COMM'N ON
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 33-36 (making a recommendation for reciprocal
discipline).
319. Id.
320. COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 15.
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Others have argued that a national practice would adversely affect
lawyers' independence and cause a related threat to the profession's ability
to protect the public against government abuses. 2 ' These objections
usually assume that a national system of law practice would require
regulation by the federal government and that the government would
consequently have more control over the way in which lawyers behave. 2
One could imagine, however, a national form of practice that would not
require federal government oversight or administrative involvement. States
could simply have their own disciplinary rules (as they do now), and
lawyers would have to comply with them when they entered new states to
practice law. Just as we all have to follow the laws of a state when we visit
even if they differ from those of our home state, lawyers would have to
follow the rules of the jurisdictions they visit. In short, a national practice
regime would not necessarily implicate federal government involvement
and is thus not inconsistent with state control over lawyer behavior.
In the end, states restrict the practice of out-of-state lawyers
considerably more than they do their own newly minted and inexperienced
attorneys. But if states are willing to give clients the freedom to choose
inexperienced recent law school graduates, one finds it hard to explain
why clients should not also have the same autonomy when it comes to outof-state lawyers. Given that all lawyers-whether in-state or out-ofstate-are prohibited from taking on cases they are unqualified to
handle, 23 the fears of out-of-state lawyers are difficult to justify.324 Or at
least this is what dominant view proponents would likely argue.325
Critics of the dominant view would reach similar conclusions through
alternative reasoning. As explained above, proponents of both the Luban
and Simon critiques of the dominant view would agree that access to legal
advice is critical. Access, of course, often turns on price, so the lower the
price, the more people will be able to afford legal services. It stands to
reason that, by increasing the supply of lawyers who are able and willing
321. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Resolving EthicalConflicts in MultyjurisdictionalPractice-Is
Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 781-85
(1995); Wolfram, supra note 177, at 703-07.
322. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 321, at 783-85; Wolfram, supranote 177, at 704-07. For one
very recent example that scholars might cite in support of this argument, see SEC Must Issue
Attorney Conduct Rules Under New FederalAccounting Reform Law, 71 U.S.L.W. 2079, 2079
(2002).
323. COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 8.
324. But see id. at 14 (identifying these arguments and suggesting that they are ultimately
unpersuasive).
325. One additional objection to a national licensing scheme is that it could jeopardize the
local nature of the bar, causing reductions in pro bono work and other public interest initiatives. Id.
at 15. There is little empirical support for this claim, though, and it is hard to imagine pro bono
work falling below the already minimal levels we currently witness. Moreover, if the level of pro
bono commitment were really a concern, states could mitigate the problem through the adoption
of mandatory pro bono requirements.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/2

60

Perlman: Toward a Unified Theory of Professoinal Regulation
TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

1037

to provide legal services in a particular state, the more competitive prices
will become. To the extent that lower prices make lawyers affordable for
more people (hardly a radical assumption), dominant view critics are also
likely to support quite liberal MJP rules.
Interestingly, the ABA's MJP Commission recognized the weight of
many of the arguments that adherents of the dominant view and its critics
would likely advance. Rather than identifying counter-arguments, it simply
concluded that there is an "absence of empirical evidence about how the
elimination of jurisdictional restrictions would affect law practice in the
United States .... [O]ne cannot necessarily conclude from [available
evidence] that eliminating geographical restrictions in their entirety will
be harmless. . . . Thus, the question is how to proceed in an area of
uncertainty. 326 The Commission answered this question by favoring a
more moderate liberalization of MJP rules.327 In support of its conclusion,
the Commission cited "the principle of state-based judicial regulation of
the legal profession, the assumptions underlying that principle, and the
support of a large segment of the bar for preserving it."'3 28 The
Commission, unfortunately, gave few reasons for why the sentiments of
"a large segment of the bar" should dictate policy on a question so
interrelated to lawyers' pocketbooks. The Commission also offered few
justifications for why it believed national practice would undermine the
state-based system of legal regulation; as explained earlier, national
practice is not inconsistent with state control over professional regulations
and discipline. Ultimately, given the bar's previous tendency to favor selfprotection, the MJP Commission should have proceeded in this area of
uncertainty by favoring the competition-enhancing proposal reflected in
the national licensing model.
There are, of course, many arguments on both sides of this issue, and
the reader is urged to consult the numerous sources that have discussed the
subject.329 The point is simply that the prevailing theories would support
an approach to MJP that is more progressive than even the most recent
liberalization allows.
C. MultidisciplinaryPractices
MDPs raise yet another structural issue about which traditional theories
would have much to say. As explained earlier, MDPs are entities in which
lawyers partner and share fees with non-lawyer professionals, such as
accountants and consultants. An ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Symposium, Ethics and the MultyfurisdictionalPracticeof Law, 36 S. TEX. L.
REv. 657 (1995).
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Practice issued a report that advocated changing the Model Rules to allow
lawyers to enter into these types of arrangements,330 but the ABA's House
" ' The question
of Delegates recently defeated the Commission's proposal.33
examined here is whether conventional ethics theories would support a
rule-revision to permit MDPs.
The dominant view, with its emphasis on client autonomy, would likely
favor MDPs for many of the same reasons that dominant view proponents
would probably support liberalized MJP rules. Namely, clients should
have the freedom to choose their legal representatives. If clients thought
they could get better services or better rates from MDPs because of the
"'one stop shopping"' MDPs would offer,332 then clients should have the
freedom to choose those entities as their legal service providers. If MDPs
did not offer effective legal services or sufficiently zealous advocacy,
clients would not hire the lawyers who worked in MDPs and the entities
333
would fail as clients eschewed MDPs in favor of traditional law firms.
One might argue that lawyers would necessarily lose professional
independence if they partnered with non-lawyers because non-lawyers
would control the legal work that MDP lawyers perform. As an initial
matter, this supposed problem is no different from what in-house counsel
regularly encounter: those lawyers do not act autonomously, but rather
report directly to non-lawyer executives within their respective companies.
Lawyers in other settings also encounter limited autonomy in many
circumstances.334 Moreover, the MDP Commission anticipated this
potential objection, and the proposed revision to the rules accordingly
prohibited non-lawyers from having authority to dictate the direction of
legal representation. 35 The problem, in short, is one which the profession
has already dealt with in other contexts and one which properly crafted
rules could avoid.336
The MDP opponent might respond that, even if the profession could
prevent a loss of lawyer autonomy through regulation, the potential for
330. COMM'N ON MULTDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 1.
33 1. Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor,A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 45 (describing the ABA
House of Delegate's defeat of the MDP Commission's proposal in 2000).
332. "One stop shopping" is a commonly cited reason for supporting MDPs. See, e.g., RHODE,
supra note 16, at 19. The idea is that clients would be able to obtain legal, accounting, consulting,
and other such services from one entity and could thus receive discounted rates and other similar
benefits from having a single provider of professional services. Id.
333. Incidentally, advocates of law and economics have made a similar argument. See Fischel,
supra note 121, at 962.
334. Id. at 954-59; see also Perlman, supra note 260, at 834-42.
335. COMM'N ON MULTDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 7-8.
336. Another commonly stated fear is the opposite ofoverzealousness: underzealousness. The
argument is that lawyers would not advocate vigorously for clients who were, for example,
litigating against a large client of the consulting arm of the MDP. Although certainly a valid
concern, this problem can also be avoided through a well-crafted conflicts of interest rule.
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excessive zealousness remains. In the drive to enhance profits for the
MDP, attorneys might bend the rules or the law to benefit the MDP's
bottom line. The Enron fiasco offers excellent fodder; people argue that
Arthur Anderson's creative accounting occurred because of its desire 3to
37
please a particularly profitable client of the company's consulting arm.
Using similar logic, the claim is that MDPs would create perverse
incentives, pushing lawyers to bend or break the law on behalf of their
clients in order to enhance the MDP's profits.3 38
This argument fails to recognize that the incentives for overzealousness already exist to at least the same degree in the traditional legal
workplace. Law firms, when representing their biggest clients, have the
very same incentives to employ excessive zeal that lawyers would have
within MDPs. 339 Among other examples, some commentators have
suggested that Vinson & Elkins's eagerness to please Enron contributed
to the questionable legal advice that the law firm provided to the
company. 34° The incentives are even greater for in-house counsel; these
lawyers receive a paycheck from a single client and thus have a
particularly strong incentive to ensure their client's success. Even
contingency cases create incentives to bend the rules in order to improve
the lawyer's bottom line. Ultimately, MDP opponents correctly observe
that pressures will exist within MDPs to engage in socially undesirable
conduct, but these critics fail to recognize that such incentives are an
inherent part of contemporary law practice regardless of the setting.34'
Dominant view critics, with their focus on justice or morality, would
also find few reasons to reject MDPs. With the prospect of large retailers,
such as Sears, offering legal services, the public would face lower fees.
Just as large department stores can under-price smaller stores, these legal
retailers could offer the public less expensive legal advice.3 42 The result
would be greater access and affordability of legal services, a consequence
fully consistent with the ambitions of the dominant view critics. As with
337. Davis, supra note 33 1, at 45 (noting that the Enron debacle "seems to reinforce what
MDP critics have always said-that MDP compromises such values as loyalty, confidentiality and
independent judgment").
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
340. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, andEnron, 8 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 9, 19-21 (2002).
341. Despite this argument in favor of MDPs in general, there may be reasons to limit MDPs
that are fully consistent with the limitations that conflicts of interest rules place on more traditional
work settings. For example, the ABA's MDP Commission recommended that accountants within
an MDP should not be allowed to attest to the accuracy of financial documents when the MDP also
represents the client's legal interests. See COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, A.B.A.,
FINAL REPORT TOTHE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, athttp://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html
(describing the Commission's opposition to a single entity providing legal and audit services) (last
visited Aug. 27, 2002).
342. Fischel, supra note 121, at 972.
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all ofthe previous discussions, the analysis here is necessarily brief. At the
very least, though, it suggests that conventional theories have something
to contribute to the debate about structural rules. At the most, it suggests
that scholars might well reach uniformly progressive conclusions about
key issues currently facing the legal profession.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has offered an unabashed attempt to coax legal ethics
theorists into the structural realm of professional regulation. If successful,
the effort would unify the bar's treatment of structural and representational
rules and offer a more compelling understanding of the very framework
that governs the legal profession. Of course, ethicists already have
addressed structural issues in considerable detail, and this Article in no
way detracts from those efforts. Rather, the point is to recognize that
conventional theories have addressed only a fraction of professional
responsibility issues and that the theories actually could offer a
different-and in many cases, a supporting-perspective from which to
examine the profession's structure. In particular, existing ethics theories
imply that we should allow multidisciplinary practices, adopt more liberal
unauthorized practice rules, and enact more permissive regulations
regarding client solicitations.
The Article also has noted that the incorporation of conventional
theories into structural debates brings a surprisingly uniform perspective
to those discussions. Unlike the theories' applications to representational
regulations, which produce markedly different conclusions about the
content of rules, the theories generally point in the same direction at the
structural level. They suggest that the bar needs to take a more progressive
approach to some of the most fundamental features of the profession. The
Article thus reaches the notable conclusion that the traditional explanations
of the lawyer's role uniformly supply potentially radical structural
implications. The hope is that ethicists will recognize the utility of this
proposed integrative approach and will explore in more detail what this
Article necessarily does only in preliminary form.
Finally, the Article has important implications for the profession's
development of its structural rules. If the bar is to downplay its image and
economic interests when creating these regulations, it must maintain
institutions that are less susceptible to self-interested considerations. As
suggested earlier, Professor Rhode's argument for greater lay involvement
in the bar's regulatory processes is one measure that would help. 3 It
would reduce the likelihood that the bar will engage in protectionist rulemaking, while maintaining the bar's control over its regulatory processes.
Ultimately, conventional theories offer strong support for more
343. RHODE, supra note 16, at 146-47.
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progressive approaches to structural regulations, but those reforms will not
come without institutional changes. With such changes, however, the
profession can hope to achieve a more coherent and unified approach to
the field of legal ethics.
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